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REGULATION AND WELFARE EFFICIENCY:
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
YOUMING LIU
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ABSTRACT
Along with rapid economic growth, China has started to face the challenge of
environment degradation. And, the integration of the Chinese economy into global
markets has put pressure on the government to address the issue of intellectual prop-
erty infringement. The government has begun to enforce copyright protection and
address environmental issues by imposing regulatory policies on related markets. In
this dissertation, I focus on two policies: the anti-piracy campaign enforcing music
copyright protection in 2015 and the vehicle license lottery policy started in 2011 in
Beijing. I empirically assess the impact of those regulations on market competition,
allocative efficiency and consumer welfare.
Copyright enforcement in China since 2015 has heightened competition among
music streaming services for obtaining exclusive licenses. The competition is driven
by the existence of multi-homing and switching costs for consumers in choosing among
services. I specify and estimate a structural model that allows consumers to tradeoff
between multi-homing and switching. I use estimates to simulate market outcomes
had a compulsory licensing provision been enforced. I find that with compulsory
licensing, the market will evolve to a “tipping” equilibrium in which all users choose
to exclusively subscribe to a same service that is of better quality. Although providing
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more music content, smaller services would lose significant market shares. This is
because multi-homing users of smaller services would switch away from their services
when the music content were less differentiated from others. The result suggests that
a compulsory provision does not benefit the smaller services and may lead to a higher
market concentration.
In the next chapter, I study a vehicle license lottery in Beijing. Although the static
inefficiency from misallocation under a lottery is well-known, I introduce the concept
of a dynamic inefficiency due to agents suboptimal timing of entering the lottery.
Using a structural empirical model, I find that households on average participate in
the lottery system at least four years earlier than they would in a counterfactual envi-
ronment with no quantity constraint. Dynamic inefficiency accounts for the majority
of the welfare loss from using the lottery policy.
In the last chapter, I formalize the concept of dynamic inefficiency via a simple
theoretical model. I show that, with reasonable assumptions, an equilibrium with
dynamic misallocation always exits. Consumers with lower willingness to pay for the
resource will enter the lottery early in order to increase the chance of winning, al-
though they may receive a negative utility if they win the lottery before their valuation
for the resource increases.
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1Chapter 1
Competition for Exclusivity and
Customer Lock-in: Evidence from
Copyright Enforcement in China
1.1 Introduction
Music streaming is growing around the world, providing ways of legitimate distribu-
tion and regaining revenue for the recorded industry. The music streaming market is
competitive - as of 2019, more than three hundred services are competing with each
other either domestically or internationally 1. Services compete with one another by
negotiating licenses with labels (music producers) in order to get their repertoires
distributed via their platform. No two services have the identical music library - a
service often has certain content exclusively available on its platform. Why platforms
often prefer to use exclusivity is an open question and has been actively addressed in
the literature in a wide range of industries. Most of the work has focused on firms’
incentives to lock out competitors (i.e. market foreclosure). This paper, however, is
studying whether exclusivity can also be used as an alternative strategy to introduc-
tory (penetration) pricing. That is, platforms invest heavily in exclusivity early in its
life cycle to capture customers until they have established a substantial user base, and
then “harvest” from the locked-in customers by raising the price. Platforms might be
more likely to do so when consumers’ willingness to pay are low but switching costs
are high.
1See https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/03/09/why-did-it-take-so-long-for-
spotify-to-turn-a-prof.aspx
2Switching costs often incur when a customer switches to a new product or a new
service and exist in various important industries, including computer software and
hardware, cable television, internet, and telecommunications. Although most preva-
lent switching costs are monetary in nature, in the case of streaming music, the reason
why switching costs arise is most likely because the personalized functions provided by
streaming services. As most services offer users personalized music discovery service
through learning users’ personal tastes, a user who has created personalized playlists
and connected with friends on a service has to consider the advantages she/he will
forgo when switching to other services. Although exclusive provision, which limits
consumers’ choice by preventing them from accessing exclusive content of other plat-
forms, makes streaming less appealing to consumers when compared with download
services or physical CDs, multi-homing may moderate this issue and it indeed becomes
a common practice for having universal access to music. However, multi-homing costs
might exist in many instances, which not only include the monetary costs of paying
subscription fees, but also include the efforts required to manage playlists across ser-
vices, remember passwords, periodic logins, and connecting to friends on different
platforms.
The development in the Chinese music industry is a good setting to study con-
sumer switching and multi-homing behavior interacting with exclusive provision. The
music industry in China has historically been hindered by rampant piracy that has
resulted in a lower willingness to pay for music. China’s online music services paying
ratio was only 3.9% which is significantly lower than that of the other online enter-
tainment formats, such as online video (with a paying ratio of 22.5% in 2017) and
online games (with a paying ratio of 14.1% in 2017).2 For the past decade, the Chi-
nese government has increased its efforts to enforce copyright protection. Accordingly,
streaming music platforms joined such efforts by investing in negotiating licenses with
2According to iResearch’s music market report. See Form F-1 Registration Statement of Tecent
Music Entertainment Group, available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1744676/
000119312518290581/d624633df1.htm.
3labels and independent copyright owners. The copyright enforcement also led to a
heightened competition in the streaming market - fierce price gouging and bidding
wars among services for getting exclusive licenses.3 Tencent became the dominant
company standing out from the competition, not only because it has the largest mar-
ket share - over 40 percent, but also because it owns the largest exclusive content
relative to other services. From 2014 to 2017, the company sealed exclusive licenses
from Warner Music Group, Sony Music, Universal Music Group, South Korean label
YG Entertainment and other domestic labels, artists and independent producers4.
The company’s exclusive album titles increased from less than 10 percent to more 30
percent of its repertoire. Smaller services, on the contrary, have less exclusive content
which make up less than 1 percent of their own repertoires.
The first goal of this paper is to estimate switching and multi-homing costs from
the aggregate data. To motivate this, I first look into important statistics from the
data and reduced form regressions to show that the data is consistent to substantial
multi-homing costs and switching costs. I find that multi-homing users are almost
doubled from August 2016 to June 2017 indicating that exclusive provision induce
multi-homing. I also find that the market share of multi-homing users cannot be
explained by independent random choice of each service which suggests the existence
of multi-homing costs. From the reduced form regressions, I find that current pe-
riod exogenous variables affect not only contemporaneous aggregate market shares of
services but also future market shares, which implies the existence of switching costs.
I then develop a structural model of consumer service adoption, usage, multi-
homing and switching behavior. Consumers are forward looking and face an infinite
horizon dynamic problem. That is, they recognize their current decision of adopting
services affects not only their contemporary utilities but also their future utilities due
3Qijun Zhou & Jing Xuan Teng, Copyright Authority Takes Aim at Exclusive Licenses for Music,
Caixin (Sep. 15, 2017, 6:14 AM), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-09-15/101145826.html.
4Thanks to Streaming Services, China’s Consumers Have Begun Paying for Music, The
Economist (July 29, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/21725529-market-dominated-
one-company-tencent-biggest-countrys-online-giants.
4to the existence of the switching costs and rapidly changing service characteristics.
Within each period, consumers face a two-stage decision problem: they pick which
streaming services to subscribe to in stage I and then determine hours spent on
each service in stage II. I estimate the model using the aggregate data on monthly
active users and aggregate usage time of each service ranging from January 2014 to
July 2017. The identification of multi-homing costs is leveraged on overlapped users
data that is observed for part of the sample period (August 2016 to June 2017).
And I estimate the switching costs by leveraging the dependence of current period
aggregate decisions on exogenous variables of the previous period. The intuition is
that if switching costs were absent, previous period decisions should be irrelevant for
current period choices.
Using parameter estimates from the structural model, I then examine the im-
pact of a counterfactual policy that mandates a compulsory license provision. Such a
provision would prohibit exclusive content by letting streaming services offer a copy-
righted song to the their users without negotiating permission from the copyright
owner, while the interests of copyright owners are protected by royalty payments.
And usually independent music rights organizations set the royalty rates 5 and col-
lect payments from services. Compulsory license provision is commonly used as a
license arrangement of many important industries. In particular, in many countries,
license fees paid by radio broadcasts for the right to broadcast music are set by a reg-
ulatory authority, rather than relying on a process of negotiation between the parties.
This is because broadcasts of music are seen to be a service of significant social value,
while copyright holders have the incentive to demand for a monopoly fee without
internalizing the positive externalities. Assessing the impact of compulsory licensing
on the streaming music industry is also at the heart of debate in the literature of legal
issues. McKay (2010) argues that the US recording industry has abused its power to
5In the United States, the royalties are based on a ”statutory rate” set by the U.S. Congress.
This rate is increased to follow changes in the economy, usually based on the Consumer Price Index.
See https://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/music-royalties6.htm
5deny uses of copyrighted music and has failed to satisfy the constitutional purpose
of copyright of providing for the public benefit. As a result, this power should be
removed and replaced with a compulsory license system similar to the Section 115
Reform Act of 2006 (SIRA) 6, which would create a blanket collective license cover-
ing digital reproduction and distribution rights for musical works. Richardson (2014)
suggests a compulsory license system with capping license fees. The article points out
that royalty rate sets by Copyright Royalty Board verges to punitive for webcasters
such as Pandora, although the service qualifies for compulsory licensing under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Base on simulations, I find when a compulsory licensing provision were enforced,
the market would evolve to a “tipping” equilibrium, in which almost all consumers
exclusively join a same platform. This is because when services are less differentiated
in their music content due to the compulsory licensing provision, the market will tip
the platform providing a better service. Similar results are also discovered in other
industries. For example, Augereau et al. (2006) finds that internet service providers
deliberately choose the modem standard incompatible to their local competitors which
prevents the market from “tipping” toward the more popular product. While unlike
standards that may complement each other, music content is not only differentiated
but is also each other’s complement. With exclusive provision, multi-homing usage
is prevalent as services complement each other, while when a compulsory provision
were enforces, multi-homing users would switch away from the small service as their
music content were less differentiated from other services and their service quality is
lower than the others.Therefore, I also find small services would lose significant mar-
ket shares under the compulsory licensing, although providing more content. Finally,
I find no evidence showing that small services would lose shares is due to the lock-in
effect caused by switching costs. The results combined show that a compulsory licens-
ing provision does not benefit the small services and might lead to a less competitive
6Section 115 Reform Act, H.R. 5553, 109th Cong. (2006) (the bill was never enacted, and thus
expired).
6market.
This paper is related to the literature in threefold. First, this paper contributes to
the empirical work on understanding the cause of exclusivities. Most of the previous
empirical literature on exclusivity has been focused on the firms’ incentives for fore-
closure and entry deterrence in both “up-stream” and “down-stream” competition
(see Chipty (2001) and Asker (2004) for up-stream competition and Lee (2013) for
down-stream competition). Theoretically, exclusivity may arise for several reasons
other than the incentive to lock out competitions especially in a two sided market:
Armstrong and Wright (2007) shows that a platform uses exclusive contract to per-
suade agents of one side to stop subscribing to the rival platform and, consequently, is
able to exploit positive network effect of the other side; Hagiu and Lee (2011) shows
that exclusivity is more likely to arise if a content provider has sold their content
outright and have no control of pricing to consumers. Ishihara and Oki (2017) ar-
gues that a monopolistic content provider leverages the strategy of setting different
number of content to be exclusively provided to each platform to balance the two
opposite effects on its bargaining power: the positive effect caused by increase in
multi-homing consumers and the negative effect caused by restriction of distribution
channels. In contrast, this paper emphasizes the effect of switching costs and focuses
on the incentive of using exclusivity to lock in customers.
Second, this paper is related to literature on switching cost estimation. Switch-
ing costs have been estimated in many markets leveraging on various estimation
strategies. Schiraldi (2011) studies auto-mobile replacement. The author argues the
existence of switching costs due to the transaction costs and estimates the costs by
observing consumers who have switched and consumers who retain their existing
choices. Both Handel (2013) and Nosal (2012) study switching costs in health in-
surance market, but different identification strategies are used. The former paper
leverages on the observations of “passive” decisions due to plan menu change and
forced re-enrollment to identify the switching costs, while the latter identifies the
7switching costs through the impact of the entry of new plans on market shares of
existing plans. The estimation strategy implemented in this paper is closely related
to Shcherbakov (2016) in which the identification of the switching costs relies on the
state dependence of consumer choices, i.e. the relationship between past purchases
and current choice probabilities (see Dube´ et al. (2010) for a discussion).
Finally, this paper also addresses important policy question in the music industry.
Since the advent of digitalization, the music industry has generated fierce debates on
numerous questions related to economics and legal issues. One strand of research has
addressed concerns of digital music on its advantage of cost reduction and displace-
ment to physical music sales(see Waldfogel (2010), Aguiar and Waldfogel (2018) and
Waldfogel (2017) for a survey). This paper is related to another strand of research
which is on measuring on the effects of anti-piracy interventions in music industry.
Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) tracked online file-sharing behavior of over 2,000 individ-
uals to assess the impact of RIAA’s pursuing legal action against individual partici-
pants of P2P file-sharing networks. Adermon and Liang (2014) studies the effect of
a copyright protection reform in Sweden in April 2009 to internet traffic and music
sales. However, few paper have studied the effects of such interventions on market
competition. This paper addresses a novel issue by focusing on competition in music
streaming market in the background of anti-piracy campaign in China.
1.2 Industry Background
In this section, I provide a brief summary on global recorded music industry and
background on music streaming services in China. Since 1999, the industry has ex-
perienced significant revenue decline (Figure 1·1). According to IFPI report, music
sales had fallen by 40 percent to $14.3 billion in the 15 years since 1999, when the rise
of digital revenues failed to offset the declines of physical sales as a result of piracy7.
After peer-to-per (P2P) illegal file-sharing services such as Napster was banned by
7International Federation for Phonographic Industry’s Digital Music Report, 2017, p. 11.
8the court 8 and anti-piracy campaign, the recorded industry has been through a long
journey of fighting against piracy and seeking for options of distributing music legally
and profitably. The appearance of streaming music services such as Spotify and
Pandora raises various optimism and concern about their impacts on recorded music
revenue. Unlike the services using download model (e.g. Apple’s iTunes), streaming
services use the subscription model of which the underlying idea is selling access to
vast collections of musical content instead of using the download-and-own model -
selling each recording separately for downloading and let users own the downloads.
There are two types of streaming services: interactive and non-interactive streaming.
The interactive streaming (e.g. Spotify) provides users complete flexibility to choose
what content they would like to play at a time of their own choosing; while the
non-interactive streaming (e.g. Pandora) provides pre-determined programming, a
resemblance of traditional broadcast radio where users can select the type of provider
or style of music, but do not have control over specific content. Generally, those
services induce consumers to listen to streaming music on demand and generate rev-
enues from paid subscriptions for premium services or advertising (Thomes, 2013).
Since appearance, streaming services have developed rapidly and attracted users to
switch from download service and illegal listening. Several researches in the existing
literature have indicated that music streamings displaces music piracy (Aguiar, 2017;
Aguiar and Waldfogel, 2018) .
1.2.1 Chinese Market and Anti-Piracy Campaign
The Chinese market is dominated by one leading firm followed by several small ser-
vices. After aggressive horizontal and vertical integrations, Tencent, one of the largest
China’s internet giants9, became the leading service taking up the largest market share
in China. Tencent started its streaming service named QQMusic in 2005, then ac-
quired Kugou and Kuwo, when it bought majority stakes in their parent company,
8A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
9Tencent is also best known for its WeChat messaging service.
9China Music Corporation (CMC) in 2016. Other small services include: Netease,
a company with origins as a gaming platform; Xiami, owned by e-commerce giant
Alibaba and Baidu Music, owned by search giant Baidu. All these services offer both
free and ad-supported interactive streaming services.
Music streaming also becomes the major source of the industry revenue in China:
from 2012 to 2016 digital-music revenues in China nearly quadrupled, to $195m; most
of that amount comes from music streaming (Figure 1·2). Music piracy was rampant
in China, especially in the era of physical music, with large scale infringement against
both local and global rights owners by selling counterfeits discs. In 2015, Chinese
government undertook an anti-piracy campaign “Sword Net” to enforce copyright
legislation and the collection of digital royalties. National Copyright Administration
of China (NCAC) set a July 2015 deadline for all Chinese music services to take down
their catalogs of unlicensed songs, then promptly removed 2.2 million unlicensed songs
(Tang and Lyons, 2016).
The copyright enforcement in China also led to a heightened competition in the
streaming market. Services compete with each other by biding for exclusive licensing
from record labels. For example, Tencent sealed exclusive licenses from Warner Music
Group, Sony Music, Universal Music Group, and South Korean label YG Entertain-
ment, by paying each label with a big, but unknown, payout10. Services also compete
with each other by filing lawsuits for copyright violations. In August, Tencent Music
and NetEase sued each other for the second time in the two years over alleged copy-
right infringement after China banned unlicensed music streaming11. In 2015, Kugou
12and Alibaba were also involved in a legal back-and-forth over music rights13.
10Thanks to Streaming Services, China’s Consumers Have Begun Paying for Music, The
Economist (July 29, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/21725529-market-dominated-
one-company-tencent-biggest-countrys-online-giants.
11Eva Yoo, Tencent Files Lawsuit Against Netease Music Over Copyright Infringement, Technode
(Aug. 25, 2017), https://technode.com/2017/08/25/tencent-files-lawsuit-netease-music-copyright-
infringement/.
12At then, Kugou was not acquired by Tencent.
13Josh Jorwitz, China’s Major Music Streamers Are Suing the Hell Out of Each Other – and
That’s a Good Thing, Quartz, July 22, 2015. https://qz.com/459551/a-whirlwind-of-lawsuits-
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1.2.2 Personalization, Multi-homing and Switching
The most prominent feature of streaming services is the ability to discover new and
listen to music digitally, without having to download song files or pay-per-track. By
utilizing technology to understand customers’ tastes, services are able to recommend a
specific user more comparable songs on a timely basis. Spotify, for example, acquired
the music intelligence platform The Echo Nest in 2014 and started to offer Discover
Weekly, a signature weekly music recommendation service based on users’ previous
playlists and personal preferences14. Pandora, the largest non-interactive service,
allows consumers to seed their own stations with a song or an artist they like. The
station then plays songs and artists similar to the seed, according to various criteria,
including musicological similarity and evidence about which music is liked in common
among consumers (Aguiar and Waldfogel, 2018). Similarly, Chinese services also offer
personalized services in various forms. For instance, users of QQMusic can establish
his/her personal homepage and share their songs or playlists via Weixin/WeChat or
QQ and other major social platforms15.
Because of the personalized services that fit each person’s music taste, active users
homing on a service, having created their own playlists, and building relationships
with other users are less likely to switch to other services frequently, i.e., substantial
switching costs arise when a user switches from one service to another. An anecdotal
evidence was that when Taylor Swift spoke out against platforms like Spotify for unfair
compensation, and Prince pulled content from some services only to offering exclusives
on others, few users did switch except for some hardcore fans. In an interview with
Tech Times, a music expert Gary Sinclair commented “ Because the switching costs
... are actually really high—I don’t mean switching costs in terms of financial, but
in terms of the amount of work they put in to develop their playlists, maybe their
among-chinas-internet-giants-might-tear-through-the-nations-piracy-habit-too/.
14http://static.echonest.com/enspex/
15See Page 140-142, Registration Statement of Tencent Music Entertainment Group,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1744676/000119312518290581/d624633df1.
htm\#rom624633\_18.
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friends are on Spotify, and even the hassle of switching providers”16. That consumers
who are accustomed to multi-home also explain why Taylor Swift and other artists’
exit has no significant impact on Spotify’s user base17. Indeed, consumers’ incentive
to multi-home is largely depending on how diversified and exclusive content are across
services.
1.2.3 Exclusive Licensing
Although with differences across countries or areas in interpretation and execution
of copyright protection, copyright law usually allows labels or independent artists to
license their recording copyright via negotiation as opposed to the composition copy-
right which is subject to a statutorily mandated compulsory license rule (Schwemer
et al., 2014). Streaming services, in particular the smaller entrants, seek for exclusive
deals as a differentiation strategy to compete with market incumbents. Tidal, which
entered the market since 2014 and is owned by a high profile artist, Jay-Z, and a
variety of other successful music artists since 2015, leverages on its advantage of be-
ing as an artist-owned streaming platform offering exclusive content already available
and expected for the future from the company owners, as well as others.18 Apple
Music, in the early stages after its launch, attempted to win paying subscribers with
proprietary content. It paid several artists including Dr. Dre and Frank Ocean an
agreed upon sum for exclusively premiering their latest albums on its service. 19As
mentioned above, services in China also aggressively bid for exclusive licenses after the
anti-piracy campaign led by the Chinese government resulting in skyrocket licensing
fee.
16https://www.techtimes.com/articles/81895/20150910/business-music-streaming-
services-deals-record-labels.html.
17See Sandy Gill’s article: “Stay, Stay, Stay”: How worried should spotify be about Tay-
lor’s exit? http://www.onlineeconomy.org/stay-stay-stay-how-worried-should-spotify-
be-about-taylors-exit/index.html
18Young, Alex (March 31, 2015). “TIDAL debuts with exclusive releases from The White Stripes,
Daft Punk, and Arcade Fire”. Consequence of Sound. Retrieved March 31, 2015.
19See https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2016/08/23/frank-ocean-just-
ignited-a-streaming-war-with-apple-and-universal-music/\#26f4eb69c636.
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However, many services in the industry appear to be abandoning the exclusive
practice either for profit maximization, or as a collusive practice against monopoly
power hold by major labels or copyright collectives. Both Spotify and Apple Music
announced to stop the expensive war for exclusive releases in 201720. As quoted
from Troy Carter, former global head of creator services of Spotify, “Exclusive audio
content, specifically with albums, is ... bad for the music industry, it’s not that great
for artists because they can’t reach the widest possible audience, and it’s terrible for
consumers”.
There is also another scope for license setting based on fairness that needs govern-
ment regulation. The best example is that many countries including U.S., Canada and
New Zealand set regulated rate paid by radio stations for the right to broadcast music,
because radio broadcasts of music are seen to be a service of significant social value
(Watt 2010). Similarly in China, in response to vicious competition and copyright
disputes between music-streaming services, Chinese National Copyright Administra-
tion came forward, seeking to stop exclusive licenses in the music industry and to
promote the “widespread dissemination” of music by regulation21. The exact form of
regulation might be either mandatory or market based policy (e.g. price ceiling), the
objective is pushing license fee to be fair and equitable to both the copyright holders
and the streaming services.
1.3 Data
In this section, I provide a description of the data used for this study. The data set
is compiled from several sources. The first source is Analysis Qianfan - a Chinese
consulting company providing services in app analytics, data mining and business
intelligence for the mobile industry in China. The data set I collected from this
20Daniel Sanchez, Spotify Makes It Clear: No More Album Exclusives (June 13, 2017), https:
//www.digitalmusicnews.com/2017/06/13/spotify-timed-exclusives/
21Qijun Zhou & Jing Xuan Teng, Copyright Authority Takes Aim at Exclusive Licenses for Music,
Caixin (Sep. 15, 2017, 6:14 AM), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-09-15/101145826.html.
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source includes aggregate information on monthly subscriptions and usage of each
music streaming service from Jan. 2014 to June 2017. Specifically, the variables are
number of active users and aggregate hours spent on each service. The consulting
company collected and generated the data set by tracking individual SDKs that are
installed on the apps of major service providers and operation systems.22.
One advantage of using the data collected by SDKs is that the usage behavior
(e.g. listening hours) is directly observed. Unlike the survey data, my data does not
rely on the accuracy of individual report. Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics
of users and usage behaviors for each service. The number of overlapped users is
also directly observed for part of sample periods from Aug. 2016 to June 2017. The
overlapped users between two services is defined as the consumer who subscribed on
two services and has stable usage of both services within a month.
Each observation in the aggregate data set is a service-month combination. The
total services observed in each month varies across the sample period: there were ap-
proximately 20 service providers observed at the beginning periods, while the number
increased to more than 100 in the later periods. For this study, I choose the six lead-
ing services that are QQMusic, Kugou, Kuwo, Xiami, Netease and Baidu. I create
the market share for each service by dividing the number of their active users over
the number of internet users in each year. The data of total internet users is collected
from China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC).
Although the aggregate data collected by SDKs is reliable, it does not provide
information on whether the user is using a freemium or a premium service, while
almost all music streaming services are operating under a freemium business model
in which basic services are free while enhanced features are available on a subscription.
Moreover, there is also a lack of enough data on the subscription fee. Therefore, there
is no enough information or variation in the data that helps to identify users price
sensitivity. However, being lack of the information on subscription fee may not affect
22More details of their SDK technology are available on the website
http://qianfan.analysyschina.com/view/help/rules.html.
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to my analysis, as the paying ratio of music streaming services grew slowing and
stayed below 4% from 2013 to 2017.23 As a comparison, video streaming market had
a merely 1.5 percent of users paying for subscriptions in 2013, while the paying ratio
grew fast in the following years and reached to 22.5 percent by 2017 (Figure 1·3).
The most important aspect of music streaming market is the content that are
available on each service. To get information on this, I collected the second data set,
which contains an exhaustive information on licensed albums. The data is directly
collected from the website of above-mentioned services. Each observation is at the
album level and has the following attributes: the album title, artist’s name, record
label, language and release date. The data was collected between Dec. 2017 and
Jan. 2018, however many record labels licensed heir copyrighted music to services
at different times before that. To address this issue, I tack the press released and
company announcement to retrieve the date that a record label signed a deal with
a service. By doing this and focus on the major labels only24, I am able to recover
the date when the music content from those labels became available on each service.
Finally, I use the dataset to create attribute variables for services, the variables include
the number of exclusively and non-exclusively licensed albums, labels and artists.
Because a consumer is allowed to choose a bundle of streaming services, the music
content of a service might be unique within some bundle choices but not others.
Therefore, I created attribute variables for each service and bundle combination 25.
In the end, I combined both data sets described above for demand estimation and
the descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 2a and 2b. In total, there
are 252 service-month observations and 4032 service-bundle-month observations.
23According to the report of iResearch, a market research and consulting company for online
business in China.
24Major labels are the Big Three labels: Sony, Warner and Universal; and big domestic labels
such as Huayi, Taihe Rye, Rock Records and EE-Media
25In the empirical application, there are six services studied in the analysis and I further assume
that a bundle contains no more than two services. Therefore, there are 22 choices in total including
the outside option.
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1.4 Preliminary Analysis
In this section, I provide a preliminary analysis of the data to illustrate the subscrip-
tion patterns that are consistent with consumer switching cost and multi-homing
cost. To show the evidence of switching cost, I apply the reduced-form method in
Shcherbakov(2016) . That is, I first run the following linear regression,
sjt = Ztβ + sˆt−1α + εjt,
where Zt is a vector of exogenous variables and sˆt−1 is a vector of market shares
instrumented using Zt−1. Then I examine the state dependence in consumer decision
by a joint test on the statistical significance of the lagged market shares. The test is
based on the simple idea that if switching costs are substantial, current period choice is
a function of the previous period decision. Because market shares are representations
of the aggregated consumer decisions, one can regress the contemporaneous market
shares on the lagged market shares instrumented with exogenous state variables. The
data is consistent with consumer switching costs in the industry if the lagged market
shares of the above linear regression are jointly significantly different from zero.
Table 1.3 shows the estimation results of above regression by using the usage
hours per active users of each services as the exogenous state variable. I choose the
usage hours as an exogenous state variable because it is a good proxy for service
quality. The regression results show that, for all service, the lagged market shares are
jointly different from zero (inferred from the F-test). The signs of own lagged market
shares are positive suggesting that larger own market share in the previous period
ceteris paribus results in larger current period own market share. Although a larger
competitor’s market share in the previous period does not always imply lower own
market share, it is consistent with the fact that consumer multi-homing. Moreover,
the level of state dependence is varying across services, as values of the test statistics
are different. This implies heterogeneous switching costs across services.
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To show the evidence of multi-homing costs and benefits, and get a sense of their
magnitudes, I compare the share of multi-homing users observed in the data to the
share simulated from the independent random choice model. The underlying idea of
this test is to examine whether a consumer adopts a service independently from its
decision to adopt another. For example, suppose that the probability that a consumer
subscribes to service A and B is 20% and 40% respectively. If the consumer makes in-
dependent choices of adopting services, the rate of subscribing to both services should
be close to 8% (=20%× 40% ). An actual rate of subscribing to both services that is
smaller (larger) than the predicted rate indicates the existence of incremental costs
(benefits) of multi-homing. Four examples presented in figure 1·4 show the share users
that simultaneously subscribe to QQMusic and another service. In these examples,
observed multi-homing rates are significantly smaller than the rates simulated from
independent random choices, suggesting the multi-homing costs are dominating the
multi-homing benefits. In another two examples presented at the top graphs of figure
1·5, which show the users subscribing to both Xiami and QQMusic, and Xiami and
Kuwo, multi-homing benefits were almost equal to costs in earlier periods, from Au-
gust to September in 2016 , as the observed and simulated rates were roughly equal
at those periods. Observed rates were then dominated by the simulated rates from
January 2017, suggesting the costs became dominating the benefits after then. Fi-
nally, the two graphs at the bottom of figure 1·5 show the examples that multi-homing
costs can be dominated by multi-homing benefits, as simulated rates are larger than
observed rates.
Whether or not multi-homing benefits are greater than the costs depends on
whether music content provided by each service in the bundle are substitutes or
complements. For instance, the benefits of subscribing to both service A and B is
greater if the music content provided by these two services are less similar. That is,
a consumer subscribing to both service can access to a wider span of music, there-
fore multi-homing could be more beneficial than costly. To verify whether this is the
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case, I further run a regression letting the difference of share of users subscribing to a
bundle between observed and predicted depend on the number of exclusive and non-
exclusive album titles available on both services within the bundle. Table 1.4 lists the
regression results under different specifications. As the number of exclusive album
titles of services in a bundle increases, the difference between observed and predicted
subscription rate of the bundle shifts towards positive suggesting that the incremental
multi-homing benefits increases. In contrast,the incremental multi-homing benefits
decreases when services in the bundle have more overlapped content, as the number
of non-exclusive album titles is negatively affecting the difference between observed
and predicted subscription rate.
1.5 Model
In this section, I develop a dynamic model of consumer adoption and use of music
streaming services. The model proceeds in two stages: In stage I, the consumer picks
which streaming service providers to subscribe to; In stage II, the consumer solves
a time allocation problem to determine hours spent on each service. The model
allows for forward-looking consumer decisions, strategic behavior of streaming ser-
vice providers, vertical product differentiation across service providers and persistent
consumer heterogeneity in preferences.
I index consumer by i and time by t. The set of streaming service providers is
denoted as J with a particular service provider denoted as j. I further use B to
represent a set of all possible subset of J . I assume that in each period, consumers’
decisions are made according to the following timing: Stage I, consumer i subscribes
(including both freemium and paid subscription) to a bundle of streaming services
b ∈ B. The out side option, indexed by o is the “download music” that are free
of charge yet require searching efforts. Stage II, consumer spends time on listening
music. The bundle b chosen by the consumer at the first stage is a union of service
providers. I proceed to describe details of each stage and further assumptions by
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reversing the order of the timing.
In stage II, I model the time allocation problem faced by consumers following
Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) who study the television market. Specifically, I let
a consumer i allocate its time `ibt ≡ {`ijt}j∈b∪{0}, where `ijt is the time spent on
listening music of service j, to solve the following maximization problem:
max
`ibt
Vibt(`ibt) =
∑
j∈b∪{0}
γijbtv(`ijbt|ηj) (1.1)
s.t. `ijbt ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ b,∑
j∈b∪{0}
`ijbt ≤ T.
Parameter γijt represents individual tastes for music that are available on service
provider j and governs the level of marginal utility of the consumer listening music
on service provider j. I further parameterize γijt as follows:
γijbt =
exp(ljbtγ
l) · ξuijt j 6= 0 and j ∈ b
ξu0t j = 0
, (1.2)
where ξuijt ∼ Exponential(ρj),
where ljbt is the set of observable characteristics including time fixed effects, and the
number of album titles and performers that are exclusively or non-exclusively available
on service provider j with respective other services in bundle b. The consumer also
observes ξuijt which represents the quality that consumer i perceives for music content
on service provider j whereas is not observed by researchers, in which superscription
u stands for usage. Finally, I assume function v(·|ηj) as an increasing and concave
function, where the level of concavity is governed by ηj. In other words, parameter
η represents the speed that marginal utility from a service provider diminishes with
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additional time spent on listening. I define optimized value from the time allocation
problem in equation 1.1 as the usage value and denote it by ν∗it(b).
The specification of usage value brings several advantages. It allows me to make
use of the listening hours to infer service qualities on each service provider that the
consumer perceives. Since I observe only the number of music titles, labels and
performers that are available on each service provider, while many other features
such as audio quality, algorithm of recommendation, interface design and so on are
hardly observable to researchers, I assume those to be captured in the usage value
via ξuijt. More usage time spent on a service provider implies better services provided
and raises the probability of higher draws in ξuijt.
Now consider the stage I. In this stage, I use the random-coefficients logit model
(Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995) to model subscription choices. Specifically, I let a
consumer i choose a bundle of services. I assume the consumer can subscribe to at
most two services provider at each period. I also assume that the consumer knows
all information required in the stage II. Thus, the consumer knows ν∗it(b) for each
possible bundle b ∈ B. I specify the utility function conditional on subscribing to
bundle b as
uit(bit, bit−1) =
∑
j∈bit−1
−ψjI(j /∈ bit) + βsν∗it(bit|dit, ljt) +
∑
j∈bit
λijt︸ ︷︷ ︸
λibt
+D(b) + εibt , (1.3)
where ψj is provider-specific switching cost and I(·) is an indicator function. Pa-
rameter λibt represents the subscription benefits in excess of the utility of listening
music, which could include easiness/cost to use the interface, extensiveness of catalog,
compatibility of applications, etc. that are observable to the consumer but may not
to researchers. I assume the subscription benefits λibt as the sum of λijt the sub-
scription benefits received from each service provider that is included in the bundle
b. I allow the interactive effect of jointly subscribing to multiple services through a
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scalar function D(b). This term represents multi-homing cost in utility of this stage
or complementary benefits if it is positive. More details on econometric specification
of equation 1.3 is delayed until the following section. The utility of the outside option,
i.e. when b = ∅, is denoted as uio. Vector εit ≡ {εibt}b∈B is idiosyncratic shock and
i.i.d across periods, consumers and service bundles.
The consumer maximized the expected present discounted value of flow utilities
over an infinite horizon. Let Ωt denote information set that includes current service
characteristics and any other factors affecting future service characteristics. Assume
that Ωt follows a first-order Markov process, the value function for the consumer is:
Vi(Ωt, bit−1, εit) ≡ E
{
max
{biτ∈B}∞τ=t
∞∑
τ=t
γτ−tE [uit(biτ , biτ−1)|Ωτ , biτ−1, εiτ ] |Ωit, bit−1, εit
}
,
(1.4)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. Since εit are i.i.d. across time, the consumer
dynamic maximization problem 1.4 is simplified and written in the form of a Bellman
equation:
Vi(Ωit, bit−1) = max
bit∈B
{uit(bit, bit−1) + γE [Vi(Ωt+1, bit)|Ωt, bit−1]} . (1.5)
The state space is further simplified by defining an inclusive value as:
δibt ≡ βsν∗ibt(bit|dit, ljt) + λibt.
The approach of reducing dimensionality of the state space is the same spirit of
Melnikov (2013) and Hendel and Nevo (2006). Note that the inclusive value does
not include the switching costs and multi-homing cost since parameters in both cost
functions are deterministic and innocuous to be exclude from state variable vector Ωt.
The inclusive value is service bundle specific, therefore it is defined differently as in
Schiraldi (2011) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) where a single log inclusive
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value is defined as expected utility received from the optimal choices26. I further
simplify the model using the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Each consumer i perceives that inclusive value δit can be summarized
by a first-order Markov process:
F (δibt+1|Ωt) = F (δibt+1|Ω′t), if δibt(Ωt) = δibt(Ω′t) ∀b ∈ B.
Assumption 1 implies that δit ≡ {δibt}b∈B is a sufficient statistics for marginal
distribution of flow utilities received from service bundle b conditional on state variable
vector Ωt . Given this assumption, I rewrite equation 1.5 as:
Vi(δit, bit−1) = max
bit∈B
{
δibt +
∑
j∈bit
−ψjI(j /∈ bit−1) +D(bit) + γE [Vi(δit+1, bit)|δit, bit−1]
}
.
I close this section by defining the firms’ strategies. Instead of modeling the
dynamic profit maximization problem explicitly that makes all service characteristics
endogenous, I assume consumers perceive the next period’s δ according to following
simple linear autoregressive specification:
δibt+1 = γib1 + γib2δibt + γib3(δibt)
2 + ζibt+1,∀b 6= ∅ , (1.6)
where ζibt+1 is independently normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ
2
ib
. I include flow utility received from each of the individual service provider into the
linear regression to capture the competition effect. Notice that streaming service
providers take the outside option, “download music” as one of the competitors, while
the outside option does not as the easiness of getting free “download music” usually
depending on exogenous policy rules.
26The log inclusive value in these two paper is not only depending on optimal choice in current
periods but also optimal choices in the future.
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1.6 Aggregation and Estimation
In this section, I provide the further parametric assumption, aggregation across con-
sumers and estimation strategy. In the first stage (the subscription stage), the sub-
scription benefits for each service provider λijt is assumed to have the following para-
metric form:
λijt = Zjtβ
Z
it + ξ
s
jt,
where Zjt is a vector of observed characteristics of each service providers and
ξsjt represents the service-specific characteristics that are observable to consumers
but not observable to researchers. Each consumer has a random preference for each
observed characteristics, βZit , that is drawn from an independent multivariate normal
distribution i.e. βZit ∼ N(βZt ,ΣZ). Note that I cannot observe individual level price
paying to the service and listed price schedules are almost identical across service
providers. Hence instead of using price, I use service fixed effect to capture the costs
of using the service and let random coefficients to capture heterogenous disabilities of
price. Assuming the idiosyncratic error εibt is distributed Type I extreme value, the
probability of bundle b chosen by consumer i given last period choice bit−1 is:
sibt(bit−1) =
exp(δibt +
∑
j∈bit −ψjI(j /∈ bit−1) +D(bit) + γE [Vi(δit+1, bit)|δit, bit−1])
exp(Vi(δit, bit−1))
.
As I only observe the subscription rate for each service provider, I further calculate
the probability that consumer i subscribe to service provider j as a summation of
choice probability of bundles that include service provider j:
sijt(bit−1) =
∑
b∈Bj
sibt(bit−1),
where Bj denotes the set of choice bundles that include service provider j. The
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aggregated subscription rate of service provider is integration of individual choice
probability across consumer types. Denote Gt(·) as the joint density function of
consumer tastes βZit , usage value V
∗ and last period subscription rate of each service
bundle, the aggregated subscription rate of service provider j is:
Sjt =
∫
sijt(bit−1) dGt(βZit , ν
∗
it, sibt−1).
In the second stage (the time allocation stage), I assume the parameters ηj that
govern the speed of marginal utility decaying to be constant across service provider
and assume the function v(`ijt|ηj) to be an iso-elastic utility function, that is
v(`ijt|η) ≡
`1−ηijt − 1
1− η .
Denote `∗ijbt as the optimal time allocated to listening music on service provider
j when the consumer is subscribing to service bundle b. Given the functional form
assumption the solution to the time allocation problem describe in equation 1.1 is
`∗ijbt =

γηijbt∑
k∈b∪{0} γ
η
ikbt
× T if j ∈ b,
0 if j /∈ b.
The expected time that consumer i spends on service provider j is the weighted
sum of optimal time spent on that service provider across subscription bundles and
the weight is the probability that the consumer subscribes to bundle b:
`∗ijt =
∑
b∈B
sibt · `∗ijbt.
Similarly, the expected usage time averaging across subscribed users is
`∗jt =
∫ ∑
b∈B
sibt · `∗ijbt dGt(βZit , ν∗it, sibt−1).
The estimation is to recover the parameters of subscription value θ1 ≡
{
βs, βZ ,ΣZ
}
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and parameters of usage value θ2 ≡
{
γl, η, {ρj}j∈J
}
. I estimate those parameters us-
ing simulated GMM by constructing two sets of moments.
The first set of moment condition utilizes the difference between the listening
hours in the data and predicted by the model. Specifically, the moment is
E
[
1
ns
∑
i `
∗
ijt − ¯`jt |Zt
]
= 0 , (1.7)
where Zt is the set of exogenous variables affecting usage time, and ns denotes the
number of consumers. ¯`ij is the time spent on service j averaged over service users.
The second set of moment conditions are:
E
 ξsjtHtξsjtHt−1
1
ns
∑
i sibt · 1(#b = k)− st(#b = k)
 = 0, (1.8)
where Ht is the vector of instruments which are exogenous shifters for the con-
temporaneous market shares and Ht−1 is the lagged exogenous shifters for the lagged
period decisions, #b denotes the number of services included in the subscription bun-
dle b and k is an integer that is great and equal than 2. The first and second moments
are constructed based on the orthogonality between the contemporaneous and lagged
instruments Ht and the unobserved characteristics ξ
s
jt and the last moment is match-
ing the share of multi-homing users.
1.7 Identification
Because identifying the discount factor in a dynamic discrete choice model is noto-
riously difficult (Rust, 1994), I don not attempt to estimate the discount factor in
this study rather than set the discount rate γ = 0.99. The primary concern in this
study is then separately identifying multi-homing and switching cost parameters from
consumer preference heterogeneity.
The identification of the switching costs relies on the state dependence in the
aggregate market shares even that the choice probabilities that govern the amount
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of users switching in and switching out are not directly observed. Two sets of as-
sumptions are needed. First I make assumptions on serial property of individual level
preferences. In particular, I assume the idiosyncratic shock in the first stage, εibt, to
be serially independent. I also assume the unobserved preference shock in the second
stage, ξuijt , and coefficients on observed service attributes are constant over time. This
assumption is, to some extent, strong as it abstracts away any persistent consumer-
specific preference that is unobservable to researchers. But the assumption becomes
less strong when I consider consumers’ heterogenous preferences, in particular, the
random coefficients. This is because the model with random coefficients allows the
persistent market share to be attributed to the persistent consumer-specific parts in
flow utilities. The second set of assumptions emphasize on the serial properties of
observed and unobserved service attributes. Specifically, I assume that ξsjt to be a
temporary shock to the service quality and mean independent to both contempora-
neous and lagged market share shifters, i.e., E
[
ξsjt|Ht
]
= E
[
ξsjt|Ht−1
]
= 0, which are
corresponding to the first and second moment conditions in equation 1.8. The same
conditions are imposed in many applications that estimate switching costs through
the aggregate market share data (e.g. see Nosal, 2012; Shchebakov, 2016; and see
Yeo and Miller, 2018 for other possible conditions). None of the above assumptions
imply that the unobserved service attributes, ξsjt, are transitory. Therefore, the level
of switching costs is determined by the persistency in market shares unexplained by
the persistency in both observed and unobserved service attributes.
For the identification of the multi-homing cost, I use the last moment condition
in equation 1.8 which levies on the data of overlapped users between services. Note
that the identification of the switching costs also affects the identification of the
multi-homing cost, because of the trade off between switching and multi-homing.
To identify consumers’ preference heterogeneity in the first stage, I assume that the
random coefficients follow normal distributions with unknown means and standard
deviations and, as discussed above, are constant over time. Therefore, the variation
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of observables across time identifies the parameters of preference heterogeneity.
Finally, the identification of preference parameters in the second stage depends
on the first set of moments presented in equation 1.7 which matches the usage time
predicted by the model and observed from the data. To be specific, the parameter for
the distribution of ξuijt , ρj , is identified by the first moment condition in equation 1.7
that matches the mean in hours spent on each services; the parameter that governs
the speed of marginal utility decaying, η, is identified by the third moment condition
that matches the average hours spent on all services; and the parameters of the
demographic characteristics, γd, are identified by the second moment condition that
matches the mean hours by demographic group.
1.8 Results
In this section, I first present the parameter estimates from the structural model, then
I discuss the implication of the results. Table 1.5 presents estimates of important
parameters in the structural model.
The top left panel of the table reports coefficient estimates of the time allocation
stage. The coefficients for music content are all positive and significant, suggesting
the more music music content a service possesses the more time users choose to
spend on that service. However, the estimates are small indicating the model is
saturated with year fixed effects. For coefficients from the service adoption stage, I
find significant substantial variance for random coefficients that govern heterogeneous
tastes of consumers. Most importantly, I find switching costs are heterogeneous in
across services. The estimates for switching costs of dominant services - QQMusic,
Kugou and Kuwo - are significant and statistically larger than the estimates of small
services - Xiami, Netease and Baidu. Specifically, among all services, Kugou has the
largest switching costs, while Xiami has the smallest switching costs. It worth noting
that the estimate for switching costs of Xiami is small and insignificant, which is
consistent to the reduced form evidence reported in table 1.3.
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Of particular interest to this study is assessing the magnitude of switching costs.
Ideally, one need to transfer the switching costs into a monetary value and compare it
with services’ subscription expenses. However, I cannot estimate the price coefficient
as neither the subscription price of each service nor the ratio of paid subscriptions is
observable. A heuristic way is comparing the estimates of switching costs to mean
utilities of services by assuming those mean utilities were totally attributed to disu-
tility from subscription expenses. For example, given that the mean utility of Kugou
is -5.29 on average over the sample period, the costs of switching away from Kugou
are equivalent to the expenses of subscribing to the service for more than one month,
suggesting its switching costs are substantial. As a comparison, the costs of switching
away from Baidu is approximately a percent of of its mean utility which is -15.04,
which indicates its switching costs are relative small. However, this way of assess-
ment is less convincing when the mean utility of a service includes many other factors
related to its service quality. Instead, I use the following two approaches to assess
the magnitude of switching costs.
In the first approach, I simulate the counterfactual market outcomes by assuming
zero switching costs, and compare the counterfactual market shares to those observed
in the data. This assessment is based on the same idea of identifying the switching
costs. That is, without the switching costs - current choices of consumers are not de-
pending on exogenous payoff-relevant variables in the last period - the persistence in
market shares is solely accounted by the persistence in consumer preferences. Thus,
the difference in time series persistence between the counterfactual and realized mar-
ket share of a service reveals the significance of its switching costs. Figure 1·6 plots
the realized and counterfactual market shares of Kugou and Baidu respectively, and
Figure 1·7 plots the month-over-month change of their market shares. When switch-
ing costs were absent, market share of Kugou fluctuates more dramatically than the
market shares with the switching costs, suggesting substantial costs of switching away
from Kugou. In contrast, switching costs of Baidu is less significant as its counterfac-
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tual and realized market shares exhibit a similar time series pattern - both fluctuate
in similar frequencies and magnitudes.
The second approach mimics the assessment on price elasticities. Except that I
examine the percentage change of market shares in response to a change in music
content. I compare a temporary 1 percent decrease in both album titles and number
of performers on each service to a permanent 1 percent decrease in those content.
The music content decreased at time td and it is unexpected to consumers before
then. I assume at time td consumers know whether the decrease in music content
is temporary or permanent. To simulate the counterfactual market outcomes I treat
consumers’ expectations in the same way that price elasticities were calculated in
Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012). For the temporal case, I compute the time td
expectations of the inclusive values, δibtd+1 , using the baseline δibtd realized in the
case of no decrease in content; for the permanent case, I use the counterfactual δibtd
realized under the decrease in content. For both cases, I compute the expectations of
inclusive values via equation 1.6 by keep the estimated coefficients.
I compute the elasticities and make the comparison between two services, Kugou
and Baidu, in figure 1·8 with td set to August 2016. An important result learned from
this figure is that less users would switch away from Kugou in the case of temporary
content drop than in the case of permanent drop, while Baidu would lose the same
amount of users in both cases. For Kugou, a permanent content drop by 1 percent
reduces its market share by 0.28 percent, while a temporary content drop leads to a
drop in its users by 0.32 percent. For Baidu the temporary and permanent content
leads a drop in users by a same amount which is around 0.08 percent. The result
is consistent to the fact that Kugou has a larger estimate for the switching costs -
users would be more likely to stay at Kugou when they expect the content drop is
temporary.
Table 1.6 reports cross elasticities of all service to a temporary content drop of
Kugou and Baidu. Each row indicates a change of users of the corresponding service
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listed in the first column. I report the percentage change of total users, both multi-
and single-homing, in panel A. Then I decompose the percentage changes of users into
multi- and single-homing and report those respectively in panel B and C. The first
column in panel A of the table shows that the content drop of Kugou not only reduces
its own users, but also reduces users of the small services such as Xiami, Netease and
Baidu. In fact, the content drop of Kugou has larger impacts on the small services -
with 5 percent drop in users on average - than on Kugou itself. As further shown in
panel B and C, although the content drop of Kugou reduces its multi-homing users
by more than 1 percent, its single-homing users are increased by almost 1 percent.
In contrast, small services lose their multi-homing users by 5 percent on average,
while their single-homing users increase by only 0.003 percent. Together these results
suggest that users who were subscribing to both Kugou and another small service are
more likely to switch away from the small service in response to the content drop in
Kugou. This is also consistent to the fact that small services have lower switching
costs - when multi-homing becomes less favorable, multi-homing users would firstly
switch away from the service with lower switching costs.
The panel at the bottom reports the estimate for coefficient related to mulit-
homing costs. Although the coefficient estimate is small, it does not indicate that the
costs for multi-homing are less important. In fact, this coefficient is not separately
identified from the constant term in the mean utility of all services, given that the
utility received from a bundle of services in the model is defined as the sum of utilities
received from each service within the bundle (see equation 1.3). Thus, the estimate
for the constant is negative reported in the top right panel where the coefficients
from service mean utility are reported, indicating that a user adopting two services
simultaneously will receive twice as big the negative utility from the constant term
as a user will receive when adopting on a single service.
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1.9 Counterfactual: An Evaluation of Compulsory Licensing
Provision
In this section, I simulate the counterfactual market outcome under compulsory li-
censing provision. The main goal of this counterfactual exercise is to examine the
impact of counterfactual policy that mandates a compulsory license provision. Such
a provision would prohibit exclusive content by letting streaming services offer a copy-
righted song to their users without negotiating permission from the copyright owner,
as long as the interests of copyright owners are protected by royalty payments. In
addition, by comparing the counterfactual market outcome to the market outcome in
reality, I can examine whether the exclusive provision favors the dominating services
(QQMusic, Kugou and Kuwo) or the small services (Xiami, Netease and Baidu).
Two aspects are changed in the counterfactual environment of compulsory licens-
ing. First, consumers have an universal access to music via using any service. Second,
no service in the market has exclusive content. I first compute the steady state mar-
ket shares of services under the compulsory provision keeping the estimated switching
costs from the baseline. An important assumption made in this counterfactual exer-
cise is that service quality in excess of its music content and switching costs were not
changed in the counterfactual environment. This assumption exclude the possibil-
ity that services might make tradeoffs from different dimensions with respect to the
change from exclusive to compulsory licensing. For example, services might invest
more in a better UI interface or more advanced algorithms to learn users’ preference
and construct play lists based on individual taste.
Next, I redo the calculation by assuming way the switching costs. However, as
illustrated in Figure 1·6, services’ market shares would mechanically increase when
the switching costs were zero, as the utilities are improved by removing the costs of
current and future periods. Therefore, in order to make a better comparison between
these two counterfactual scenarios, I assume that switching costs were removed unex-
pectedly by consumers. That is, although consumers would be free from the switching
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costs in current periods, they still expect the one time costs will occur if they switch
away from a service in the future.
I compute the steady state variables by taking sample averages of mean utili-
ties and music content variables. The simulation results are presented in table 1.7,
where the baseline results are present in the first column. Column 2 and 4 respec-
tively present the counterfactual results of compulsory licensing with and without
the switching costs. Column 3 and 5 present the percentage change of counterfactual
results with respect to the baseline.
Under the exclusive licensing provision, I find the CMC services including QQ-
Music, Kugou and Kuwo are dominating the market, which is not surprising as those
services have more exclusive content than the rest of services. I also find multi-homing
usage are dominating under the exclusive provision for all services. Indeed, as music
content is not only a differentiated product but also a complement good to each other,
when services are more differentiated by their exclusive content, multi-homing usage
will be prevalent.
Under the first counterfactual environment in which a compulsory licensing pro-
vision were enforced, I find that market shares of all services except Kuwo would
drop by more than 90 percent compared to the baseline. On the contrary, the market
share of Kuwo would be almost twice as big as its market share in baseline. Stated
another way, the market under the compulsory licensing would evolve to a tipping
equilibrium in which consumers would exclusively join a same platform. This is be-
cause under the compulsory licensing provision, services are less differentiate by their
exclusive content, while the only factor that is different across services is the service
fixed effect embedded in the service mean utility. The mean utility of Kuwo in the
steady state is -7.37 which is larger than mean utilities of the small services that
are lower than -10. Although Kuwo does not have the large mean utility among all
services in the CMC group, it has small switching costs than the other two services.
Because the level of the mean utility is representing the service quality in excess of
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music content, the result implies that consumers would be more likely to switch to
a service that is of better quality. For the small services, single-homing users would
increase under the compulsory licensing by at least 25 percent compared to the base-
line, although the shares would be very small. As illustrated in panel C, without
exclusivities, multi-homing would become the least favorable choice, thus the share
of multi-homing users were close to zero, suggesting a compulsory licensing provision
would steer multi-homing users to switch away from the small service.
It is also worth noting that the share of users choosing the outside option under
compulsory licensing would be about 3 percent lower than under the exclusive licens-
ing. Thus, while the compulsory licensing would encourage more streaming music
users, the influence would be very limited. In term of welfares, if the licensing were
switching from exclusive to compulsory, consumer welfare would increase by 5 percent
from 218.52 utils to 230.35 utils on average per person.
Finally, by comparing the counterfactual result of compulsory licensing when
switching costs were removed temporarily for one period, I find market shares of
services were not much different from results of the first counterfactual simulation.
Although a small share of users would switch to the small services when switching
costs were removed, the market shares of the small services under the compulsory
licensing would still be much smaller than under the exclusive licensing. Hence, the
lock-in effect by switching costs is not the main reason why small services would lose
market share under the compulsory licensing. All these results combined suggest that
a compulsory licensing provision would not benefit the small services.
1.10 Conclusion
This paper specifies and estimates a structural model that allows consumer to tradeoff
between multi-homing and switching. With model estimates, I simulate the market
outcomes had a compulsory licensing provision been enforced. I find with the compul-
sory licensing enforced, the market will tip the service with a better service quality.
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Although providing more music content, small services would lose significantly market
shares.
Enforcing a compulsory licensing provision in the streaming music market receives
increasing supports recently, especially in China. The pro-compulsory side believes
such a provision will reduce services burden of paying expensive licensing fees and
benefit suers by increasing their access to more music content. However, my analysis
shows such a provision might lead to a higher market concentration.
My analysis also shows a compulsory licensing would not benefit the small ser-
vices and might force those services to exit. Although providing more content under
the compulsory provision, small services would lose a significant market shares as
the multi-homing users would switch away from their platforms when their content
were less differentiated from others. Again, my analysis highlights the fact that a
compulsory licensing might lead to a less competitive market.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Users and Listening
Variables QQMusic Kugou Kuwo Netease Xiami Baidu
Platform Users
Avg. MAU (M) 125.302 116.464 63.098 16.067 6.239 12.924
Avg. Market Share (%) 17.635 16.081 8.936 2.160 0.852 0.019
Avg. Total Listening Hours (MM
hrs.)
321.045 521.295 145.300 87.143 18.122 21.959
Avg. Listening Hours/MAU (hrs.) 2.329 4.073 2.275 3.914 2.085 1.699
Notes: Statistics are calculated from the aggregate data set described in Section 3. Total sample period is
from Jan. 2014 to June 2017. MAU stands for monthly active users.
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Table 2a: Summary Statistics of Music Contents
Variables QQMusic Kugou Kuwo Netease Xiami Baidu
Album Titles
Total # Title Released 97764 97834 98320 63221 66464 17432
# Titles Released
/Month
2273.581 2275.209 2286.512 1470.256 1545.674 405.395
(Min,Max) (1100, 3612) (912, 3775) (1058, 3775) (815, 2530) (999, 2489) (249, 692)
Labels
Total # Labels 39233 39351 39533 37204 38534 24483
# Labels/Month 912.395 915.140 919.372 865.209 896.140 569.372
(Min,Max) (174, 1295) (165, 1301) (172, 1303) (132, 1288) (162, 1271) (54, 1023)
Performers
Total # Peformers 1303825 1273588 1286292 929410 1055338 313218
# Performers/Month 30321.510 29618.330 29913.770 21614.190 24542.740 7284.140
(Min,Max) (1221, 63418) (1062, 62931) (1264, 63112) (903, 45849) (1065, 48737) (272, 15560)
Table 2b: Album Titles over Years
Variables Year Tencent Kugou Kuwo Netease Xiami baidu
# Album Titles (Monthly Average)
2014 1371.250 1369.417 1409.917 1456.167 1203.333 309.750
2015 2230.250 2136.250 2136.250 1456.167 1613.000 425.500
2016 2941.583 2956.083 2956.083 1872.000 1900.250 471.333
2017 2750.429 2899.000 2899.000 1669.857 1409.286 421.857
# Exclusive Album Titles(Monthly Average)
2014 133.833 150.667 170.000 1.000 0.667 21.083
2015 451.333 401.000 401.000 0.917 1.417 1.083
2016 670.250 742.333 742.333 0.500 0.750 0.833
2017 875.571 963.286 963.286 1.571 0.143 0.857
Notes: The top table shows the summary statistics of albums, labels and performers that are available on each services. The
bottom table shows the statistics of total and exclusive albums titles by services by year. Statistics are calculated for the
variables generated from music licensing data set described in Section 3. Total sample period is from Jan. 2014 to June
2017. Variables of each service in the top table have 252 service-month observations. Variables in the bottom table have 12
observations for each service and years from 2014 to 2016 and 7 observations for each service in 2017.
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Table 1.3: Reduced-Form Evidence of State Dependence in Aggregate
Consumer Decisions
QQMusic Kugou Kuwo Xiami Netease Baidu
sˆt−1
QQMusic 0.456*** -0.044 -0.305*** -0.004 -0.010 -0.059*
(0.156) (0.218) (0.105) (0.024) (0.037) (0.035)
Kugou -0.003 0.736*** 0.120 -0.043 -0.028 0.037
(0.156) (0.220) (0.104) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038)
Kuwo 0.127 0.066 0.098 -0.087 -0.060 -0.094
(0.368) (0.384) (0.213) (0.053) (0.081) (0.077)
Xiami 2.749 -6.712** -0.175 -0.041 -2.020*** -0.131
(2.050) (2.782) (1.303) (0.313) (0.507) (0.456)
Netease -1.355** -0.131 0.707* 0.057 0.696*** 0.149
(0.536) (0.844) (0.390) (0.082) (0.157) (0.122)
Baidu -1.321 -2.967** -0.948 -0.151 -0.127 0.154
(0.969) (1.354) (0.656) (0.201) (0.317) (0.259)
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.970 0.997 0.943 0.982 0.999 0.857
F-test 24.940 45.890 39.770 6.690 52.270 16.640
(p-val.) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.351) (0.000) (0.011)
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Notes: The dependent variable is the contemporaneous market share of each
service. Only the lagged market shares are presented in the table, other charac-
teristics of services such as the usage hours per active users, number of album
titles, etc., are included in the regressions but not reported. The exogenous state
variable is the usage hours per active users which is taken as a proxy for service
quality. The lagged market shares are instrumented by the lagged exogenous
state variables. F-test is used to test the joint significance of lagged market
shares.
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Note: The dependent variable is the difference between multi-homing users observed and 
predicted by the independent random choice model. Each observation is at the bundle level 
and each bundle contains two services. Exclusive albums are the album titles exclusively 
available on services in the bundle. Non-exclusive albums are the album titles commonly 
available on both services. All explanatory variables are in logarithmic form except for the 
constant and fixed effects. 
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Table 1.4: Dependence of Multi-homing on Music Content
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
# exclusive albums 0.0025** 0.0022** 0.0006*** 0.0004*
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002)
# non-exclusive albums -0.0039 -0.0049 0.0073** -0.0095**
(0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0038)
Service FE No No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes
N 135 135 135 135
R2 0.3557 0.4170 0.8957 0.9297
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Note: The dependent variable is the di↵erence between multi-homing users observed
and predicted by the independent random choice model. Each observation is at the
bundle level and each bundle contains two services. Exclusive albums are the album
titles exclusively available on services in the bundle. Non-exclusive albums are the album
titles commonly available on both services. All explanatory variables are in logarithmic
form except for the constant and fixed e↵ects.
38
Table 1.5: Estimation Results for the Dynamic Model
Time Allocation: Service Adoption:
γcons -5.485 βcons -6.024
(0.219) (0.240)
γalbum 0.086 βtrend -0.158
(0.039) (0.034)
γEalbum 0.431 βtrend2 0.002
(0.015) (0.001)
γperformer 0.457 σcons 1.054
(0.024) (0.023)
γEperformer 0.650 σcmc 0.657
(0.018) (0.083)
η 0.960 βs 1.401
(3.166x10−4) (0.033)
Switching Cost (ψ):
ψQQMusic -3.819 ψXiami -0.177
(0.144) (0.368)
ψKugou -6.581 ψNetease -1.035
(0.455) (0.514)
ψKuwo -2.852 ψBaidu -0.163
(0.573) (0.031)
Multi-homing Cost:
θmc -0.610
(0.180)
Note: The estimation results are from
simulated GMM which are based on the
moment assumptions listed in equation
1.7 and 1.8. The random coefficients are
the standard deviations of normal distri-
butions, where σcmc is the random coeffi-
cient for constant and σcmc is the random
coefficient for the dummy variable indi-
cating services of CMC group. The CMC
group has QQMusic, Kugou and Kuwo.
Both service and time fixed effects are in-
cluded, but the estimates of those are not
reported.
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Table 1.6: Elasticity to a temporary change in music content
Panel A: %4 of all users
Kugou Baidu
Ouside 0.073 4.44× 10−4
QQMusic -0.015 0.001
Kugou -0.279 0.000
Kuwo 0.070 0.000
Xiami -4.936 0.005
Netease -4.223 0.005
Baidu -6.575 -0.079
Panel B: %4 of multi-homing users
Kugou Baidu
QQMusic -0.025 0.001
Kugou -1.276 -0.002
Kuwo 0.064 −4.08× 10−4
Xiami -4.940 0.005
Netease -4.226 0.005
Baidu -6.576 -0.072
Panel C: %4 of single-homing users
Kugou Baidu
QQMusic 0.010 2.07× 10−4
Kugou 0.997 0.002
Kuwo 0.006 1.54× 10−4
Xiami 0.003 3.19× 10−5
Netease 0.003 1.45× 10−5
Baidu 3.74× 10−4 -0.007
Note: This table reports percentage
changes in users of all services in re-
sponse to a temporary 1% drop in con-
tent of Kugou and Baidu. Each row in-
dicates the change in users of the corre-
sponding services listed in the first col-
umn. Panel A reports the percentage
change of both multi- and single-homing
users; Panel B and panel C respectively
reports the change of multi-homing users
and single-homing users as a percentage
of all users (multi- and single-homing ) in
the baseline model.
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Table 1.7: Market Shares in Steady State: Exclusive and Compulsory Licensing
Panel A: Multi- and Single-homing
exclusive (baseline)
compulsory
w/ switching costs % 4 to the base-
line
w/o switching costs % 4 to the base-
line
Outside 0.6129 0.5930 -3.2364 0.5884 -3.9892
QQMusic 0.2326 0.0145 -93.7615 0.0221 -90.5198
Kugou 0.2237 0.0167 -92.5401 0.0114 -94.9141
Kuwo 0.1378 0.3749 171.9537 0.3740 171.2956
Xiami 0.0166 0.0003 -98.3986 0.0011 -93.1045
Netease 0.0647 0.0006 -99.0700 0.0028 -95.7158
Baidu 0.0117 0.0001 -99.5055 0.0003 -97.4924
Panel B: Single-homing
exclusive
compulsory
w/ switching costs % 4 to the base-
line
w/o switching costs % 4 to the base-
line
QQMusic 0.0108 0.0145 34.4358 0.0221 104.6335
Kugou 0.0562 0.0167 -70.3731 0.0114 -79.7616
Kuwo 0.0195 0.3749 18.2167 0.3740 1817.1745
Xiami 0.0002 0.0003 25.8587 0.0011 446.0109
Netease 0.0004 0.0006 46.9672 0.0028 581.9781
Baidu 0.0000 0.0001 121.7924 0.0003 1032.2739
Panel C: Multi-homing
exclusive
compulsory
w/ switching costs % 4 to the base-
line
w/o switching costs % 4 to the base-
line
QQMusic 0.2219 0.0000 -99.9891 0.0000 -99.9899
Kugou 0.1675 0.0000 -99.9894 0.0000 -99.9947
Kuwo 0.1184 0.0000 -99.9625 0.0000 -99.9702
Xiami 0.0163 0.0000 -99.9879 0.0000 -99.9877
Netease 0.0643 0.0000 -99.9932 0.0000 -99.9931
Baidu 0.0117 0.0000 -99.9967 0.0000 -99.9967
Note: This table reports steady state market shares of services under exclusive and compulsory licensing. Panel
A reports the shares of both single- and multi-homing users. Panel B and C respectively reports the steady state
shares of single-homing and multi-homing.
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Figure 1·1: Global Recorded Music Industry Revenues 1999-2017 (US$ Billions)
Notes: The graph plots the total revenues of the global recorded music industry from 1999 to 2017 and the breakdown of
revenue by different sources. Adapted from ”Global Music Report 2018” by IFPI, 2018.
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Figure 1·2: China’s Recorded Music Industry Revenues 2012-2017 (US$ Millions)
Notes: The graph plots the total revenue of recorded music industry in China from 2012 to 2017. Adapted from ”Global
Music Report 2017” by IFPI, 2017.
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Figure 1·3: Paying Ratios of China’s Music Streaming vs. Video Streaming
Notes: The graph at the top plots the ratio of paid subscriptions to total subscriptions in the music streaming market and
video streaming market. And the table below shows the figures of those paying ratios. Adapted from ”2018 China Online
Music Report” by iResearch consulting company, 2018.
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Figure 1·4: Example of Multi-homing I
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(a) QQMusic and Kugou
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(b) QQMusic and Kuwo
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(c) QQMusic and Netease
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(d) QQMusic and Baidu
Notes: The graphs above plot the share of multi-homing users. The top left graph plots users subscribing to QQMusic and
Kugou simultaneously; The top right graph plots users subscribing to QQMusic and Kuwo simultaneously; The bottom left
graph plots users subscribing to QQMusic and Netease simultaneously;The bottom right graph plots users subscribing to
QQMusic and Baidu simultaneously. In all graphs, the black bar represents the share of multi-homing users observed in the
data; the gray bar represents the share simulated by independent random choice model.
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Figure 1·5: Example of Multi-homing II
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
2
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
4
.
0
0
5
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
U
s
e
r
s
2016m8 2016m9 2016m10 2016m11 2016m12 2017m1 2017m2 2017m3 2017m4
(a) Xiami and QQMusic
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(b) Xiami and Kuwo
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(c) Xiami and Netease
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(d) Xiami and Baidu
Notes: The graphs above plot the share of multi-homing users. The top left graph plots users subscribing to QQMusic and
Xiami simultaneously; The top right graph plots users subscribing to Kuwo and Xiami simultaneously; The bottom left graph
plots users subscribing to Xiami and Netease; The bottom right graph plots users subscribing to Xiami and Baidu. In all
graphs, the black bar represents the share of multi-homing users observed in the data; the gray bar represents the share
simulated by independent random choice model.
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Figure 1·6: Model Prediction of Service Adoptions
Notes: The left graph plots the adoption rates of Kugou and the right graph plots the adoption rates of Baidu Music. Solid
lines are the adoption rates observed from the data. Dashed lines are adoption rates predicted from the model assuming zero
switching costs.
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Figure 1·7: MoM change in Service Adoptions
Notes: The left graph plots the month to month change in adoption rates of Kugou and the right graph plots the change in
adoption rates of Baidu Music. Solid lines are the adoption rates observed from the data. Dashed lines are adoption rates
predicted from the model assuming zero switching costs.
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Figure 1·8: Dynamic elasticities to a change in music content
Notes: The left graph plots the percentage change in adoption rates of Kugou in response to a 10% decrease in its music
content; and the right graph plots the change of Baidu Music. Solid line indicates market response to a temporary change;
dashed line indicates market response to a permanent change.
49
Chapter 2
The Dynamic Efficiency in Resource
Allocation: Evidence from Vehicle License
Lotteries in Beijing
2.1 Introduction
Lotteries are commonly used by government agencies and institutions to distribute
scarce resources. Examples include, but are not limited to, subsidized housing, hunt-
ing permits, charter school admissions, and medical interventions such as organs and
vaccines, which are usually not allowed to transfer. In most cases, lotteries lead to
welfare loss as the resources are not allocated to the users who value them the most.
The literature has examined inefficiency of lottery arising from the cross-sectional
heterogeneity in the WTP across users in a static framework. In this paper, we iden-
tify an additional inefficiency of using lottery when the resources under consideration
are durable. Because a lottery system could delay agents’ access to a resource, those
agents who want to use the resource at present may have to wait for a long period
before winning the lottery. In anticipation to that, forward-looking agents enter the
lottery pool earlier than they would otherwise purchase the resource. Additionally,
they enter even earlier in anticipation of increased difficulty of winning the lottery. By
influencing the timing that agents enter the lottery pool, lotteries could exacerbate
the allocation inefficiency due to the suboptimal timing. That is, agents who need the
resource less urgently would enter the lottery early which further reduces the chances
of allocating resources to the urgent agents. Misallocation in this kind is temporal in
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nature thus the welfare loss from this channel is termed as dynamic inefficiency.
In this paper, we analyse the dynamic inefficiency of using lottery by examining the
case of vehicle license lottery policy in Beijing. In 2011, Beijing municipal government
introduced a vehicle quota system to curb the dramatic increase in vehicle ownership
and combat worsening traffic congestion and air pollution. The policy puts a cap on
newly issued vehicle licenses and uses a non-transferable lottery system to allocate
the limited number of licenses. A key feature of the lottery is the dramatic expansion
of the participation pool and decrease of the winning odds. In January of 2011,
around 180 thousands households applied to participate in the lottery. This number
increased to 1.34 million by the end of 2012 and over 12 million by the end of 2017.
This resulted a rapid plunge of the winning probability: it decreased from 9.4 percent
in January 2011 to about 1 percent by the end of 2012 and further to 0.1 percent
by the end of 2017. In contrast to the rapid growth of lottery participations, vehicle
sales increase moderately in the periods before the policy and in cities that have not
implemented the vehicle quota system. The sales data in Beijing indicates that there
were up to 800 thousands vehicles sold in 2010, the year before the lottery policy, and
sales grew steadily at a rate of approximately 2 percent in each month. The vehicle
sales in Tianjin, a neighboring city of Beijing, shows a slight decrease from 2010 to
2011 and moderate growth from 2011 to 2012.1 The contrast between the moderate
growth rate of vehicle sales and the rapid drop of winning probabilities suggests that
the policy may have induced people to enter the lottery pool earlier than when they
would buy a vehicle in the absence of the policy. The change in purchase timing could
have significant welfare implications.
The main objective of the empirical study is to quantify the welfare impact and,
in particular, the dynamic inefficiency from the license lottery in Beijing. To achieve
this, we develop and estimate a structural discrete choice model of dynamic consumer
demand for both license plate and vehicles. Using a dynamic model is necessary
1Tianjin did not start a similar license lottery policy until 2014.
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because we are studying the dynamic efficiency. Apart from this, we also believe it is
the right model to describe the vehicle market and the policy regulation in Beijing.
Indeed, vehicles are durable good and households’ characteristics such as incomes
are changing over time. As a result, the choice of when to buy is as important to
households as what to buy. Similarly, vehicle licenses are also durable. Therefore,
with lottery policy on restricting licenses households are making decision on whether
or not enter the lottery based on past information and anticipated future actions of
others. Moreover, a dynamic model accounts for dynamic households considerations
of participating in the lottery. A static model assumes households are participating
because they need to buy a car at that period and therefore biases the estimation of
demand.
In our model, we follow and further extend the empirical methodology of Gowrisankaran
and Rysman (2012) (henceforth GR), in which they develop a dynamic replacement
framework nested with a BLP-style demand to capture product differentiation, endo-
geneity of prices, changing of the choice set, persistent consumer heterogeneity, and
repeat purchases over time. Different from the GR framework, we model households’
decisions in two stages. Households first decide whether to enter the lottery and then
conditioning on winning the lottery, decide when to buy a vehicle and which vehicle
model to purchase. The utility from participating in the first stage is the expected
option value of purchasing a vehicle if winning. This allows the heterogeneity from
driving different vehicles to affect the heterogeneity in the utility of lottery partici-
pation: households who would receive a higher utility from vehicle purchase should
participate in the lottery with a larger probability.
We follow the same identification strategy as in Li (2017) by employing the com-
mon trend assumption in the difference-in-differences (DID) framework to aid iden-
tification. Tianjin, as the largest city close to Beijing, does not implement a vehicle
quota system during the sample period. Hence, we include market-level data of Bei-
jing and Tianjin and show through graphs and regressions, the automobile markets
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in these two cities exhibit a similar trends. Similar to Petrin (2002), we use micro
moments drawn from the household surveys to increase the precision on preference
heterogeneity.
The counterfactual analysis shows that households would accelerate their partic-
ipation in the market under the lottery policy: households on average participate in
the lottery system at least four years earlier than they would purchase a vehicle in the
counterfactual environment of no quantity constraint. Due to the fact that the policy
requires lottery winners to purchase a vehicle within six months 2, the counterfactual
analysis shows that, on average, winners purchase their vehicles six months earlier
than they would without the lottery policy. To quantify the dynamic inefficiency, we
consider two counterfactual scenarios. The first scenario assumes efficient allocation
in which only households with the highest valuations are allocated with the licenses.
The inefficiency is characterized by the welfare difference between this first scenario
and the scenario with the lottery policy. The second scenario eliminates the partici-
pation decision and assumes the license is randomly allocated with equal probability
among households who would purchase a vehicle without the quantity constraint.
Since no accelerated participations exist in the second scenario, only static misalloca-
tion occurs. The dynamic inefficiency is captured by the welfare loss net of the static
inefficiency. The welfare analysis indicates that dynamic inefficiency accounts for the
majority of welfare loss from the misallocation: 82 and 98 percent of total welfare
loss respectively in 2011 and 2012 is attributed to the dynamic inefficiency, while the
static misallocation accounts for the remainder.
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First,
it adds to the literature on the efficiency of various mechanisms of resource alloca-
tion. Researchers have argued that lotteries represent a fair mechanism for allocating
resources, especially when objects are indivisible (Aubert, 1959; Eckhoff, 1989; Fien-
2Those lottery winners who fail to comply this rule will not be allowed to renter the lottery within
three years.
53
berg, 1971; Hofstee, 1990).3 Boyce (1994) shows that the “fairness” of using lottery
represents in preventing the rent-seeking behavior and speculation. The author shows
that lotteries preserve more economic rents for all participants than they would receive
under alternative allocation mechanisms such as auction, queues or merits. Hazlett
and Michaels (1993) empirically estimate rent-seeking costs in FCC cellular telephone
license lotteries where lottery participants need to pay a consulting firm an entry fee
for submitting the application. There are also several empirical papers focused on
misallocation of lottery. Oi (1967) studies military draft and provides empirical esti-
mate of allocative costs by taking occupational preferences for military versus civil-
ian employments into considerations. Both Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) and Davis
and Kilian (2011) study price controls in the housing market in New York and the
U.S. residential market for natural gas respectively, and find significant misalloca-
tion of products under the random assignment to excessive demand. The literature
on lottery mechanism has focused on the cross-sectional heterogeneity among users,
however this paper identifies an additional misallocation due to consumers’ temporal
considerations, and provides an empirical quantification of the welfare outcomes.
Second, unlike dynamic models using household-level data to study learning or
inventory behavior (Ackerberg, 2003; Hendel and Nevo, 2006), this paper uses model-
level monthly data to study policy questions. There exists a growing literature that
uses dynamic models to investigate questions of policy interest. This includes the
studies on vertical integration in video game industry (Lee, 2013), scrappy cost and
subsidies of used car market (Schiraldi, 2011; Li and Cao, 2013), evaluation of envi-
ronment policy (such as Clean Air Act and water allocation; see Ryan (2012); Donna
and Esp´ın-Sa´nchez (2016)), resource exploitation (Huang and Smith, 2014). Our pa-
per shares the same feature with Lee (2013) on using dynamic demand model and
aggregate data in estimation. In this paper, we study the effects of lottery policy on
3In the same spirit, Kahneman et al. (1986) use the survey experiment to show that consumer
sometime value “fairness” as more important. The example he provides is that in allocating the
concert tickets, consumers prefer queues to lotteries to auctions.
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households’ temporal decisions and investigate the dynamic efficiency of this mecha-
nism. We closely follow Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) and Melnikov (2013) in
the assumption of logit error terms in our model. Logit errors may cause unrealistic
welfare gains. Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Berry and Pakes (2007) have proposed
discrete-choice models that do not include logit i.i.d error term. Our dynamic model
has no secondary market while Esteban and Shum (2007) model oligopoly competition
with a secondary market in the automobile industry.
Third, this study also adds to the literature on the automobile market and envi-
ronmental policies in China. The rapid growth of China’s automobile industry offers
a fertile ground on many interesting questions including the issue of market power
(Deng and Ma, 2010), pricing competition across joint ventures within the same cor-
poration group (Hu et al., 2014) , price evolution over time (Li et al., 2015), pollution
and labor supply reductions from Beijing’s driving restrictions (Viard and Fu, 2015)
and local protectionism in the automobile market (Barwick et al., 2017). The un-
precedented economic growth and lax environmental regulations have led to the rapid
deterioration in environmental quality. In an attempt to reduce air pollution, central
and local governments have adopted a series of policies aimed at reducing vehicle
usage or ownership. There is limited understanding of the effectiveness and efficiency
of these policies (Li, 2017). This study adds to the literature by estimating the wel-
fare costs of vehicle license lottery policy in Beijing. This is the first paper to our
knowledge that applies a dynamic framework to study this industry and the vehicle
purchase restriction policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the background
of vehicle lottery policy in Beijing. We also introduce the data pattern and prelim-
inary reduced form results. In section 2.3, we present a structural model of lottery
participation and demand for vehicles. We further discuss the estimation strategy
and identification in the same section. Section 2.4 presents the estimation results and
the implication of the estimates. We analyse counterfactual scenarios in section 2.5.
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Finally we present the welfare analysis in section 2.6 and conclude in section 2.7.
2.2 Policy Background and Data
In this section, we first describe the vehicle lottery policy in Beijing. We then present
the data and preliminary analysis thereafter.
2.2.1 Policy Background
Beijing is routinely ranked as one of the cities with the worst traffic congestion and
air pollution in the world. According to Beijing Transportation Annual Report 2011,
the traffic speed on arterial roads within the 5th ring road averaged 23.1 km/h during
morning peak hours (7:00-9:00) and averaged 20.9km/h during afternoon peak hours
(17:00-19:00). Compared to average traffic speeds in 2005 which were 36.4km/h
and 32.3km/h respectively during morning and afternoon peak hours, average traffic
speeds reduced by approximately 40 percent in five years. Meanwhile, Beijing also has
for many years suffered from serious air pollution. The average daily concentration
of PM2.5 frequently reaches over 250 micrograms per cube meter, compared to the
recommended daily level of 20 by WHO.
Congestions and air pollutions are direct consequences of the dramatic vehicle
ownership and usage in Beijing.4 Along with the extraordinary growth in income
level per capita, annual sales of new passenger vehicles in Beijing increased from 2.6
million units in 2005 to 4.8 million in 2010. 5
To address air pollution and traffic congestion, Beijing municipal government an-
nounced the vehicle lottery policy that caps the new licenses registration in each
month. The announcement was made on Dec. 23th 2010 and new registrations were
4According to Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau, exhaust emission from motor vehicles is
the largest source of PM2.5, accounting for 22 percent in the whole city and about one third in the
urban core. The second largest source of PM2.5 is coal burning (17 percent) followed by construction
site dusts (16 percent) in 2012.
5The household vehicle ownership rate is 0.58 in Beijing, comparing to 0.46 in New York city and
1.16 in the U.S. from 2010 U.S. Census.
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frozen starting from Dec.24th. Licenses are allocated through a publicly-held lottery
administered by the Beijing Municipal Commission of Transport. Since January 2011,
the lottery is held on 26th of each month, with approximately 20,000 license allocated
to selected applicants from the lottery pool.
Licenses from the lottery are not transferable, so as to the licenses of a used
car, gifted car or car transferred from out-of-state registration. However, a license is
allowed to transfer to a new vehicle from a scrapped old one if legal owners of both
vehicles are same. 6 Lottery policy is also accompanied with a server traffic control
regulation. Out-of-state vehicles are not permitted to drive into the 5th ring road
(within which the vast majority of business and population are located) during the
weekday rush hours of 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., and 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. In addition,
out-of-state vehicles that drive into Beijing also need a special permit which is only
valid for 7 days.
Lottery participation has no monetary costs, while applicants pay opportunity
cost as application procedure is time consuming. First, all applicants need to be a
legal driver (with a valid driver license). Second, they need to sign into a government
website and filling their information online. A screening process is the next step for
verifying applicants’ qualification. Eligible applicants include Beijing residents and
non-residents who have been paying income tax for at least five years in Beijing.
Applicants can finally submit their applications for entering the lottery when above
steps are completed.
As discussed further in previous section, the lottery policy in Beijing is featured
with excessive participations and low winning probability. Moreover, it is an salient
issue in all cities of China that are implementing vehicle quota system7. As shown
6Anecdotally lottery winners may rent their licenses to others through a black market. However
this is unlikely to be widespread because the legal owner (the winner) not only has the liabilities in
paying annual registration fee, traffic fines and emission inspections, but also is liable for damages
and injuries in accidents.
7By the end of 2017, there are 8 major cities in China having started vehicle quota system and 6
of them are using lottery to allocate license. Besides Beijing, Guiyang is another city that is using
lottery mechanism only. The rest cities including Tianjin, Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Shenzhen are
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in Appendix Table A.1, which summarizes allocation mechanisms and winning prob-
abilities of those cities, all cities that are incorporating lottery into their allocation
mechanism are featuring winning probability lowering than 1 percent by the end of
2017.
2.2.2 Data
Our empirical analysis focuses on the lottery policy in Beijing and we bring a nearby
city,Tianjin into analysis to facilitate identification. Tianjin is about 150km from
Beijing. The characteristics of these two cities are shown in Appendix Table A.3.
Beijing is one of the largest cities in China by population; Tianjin is the sixth.8 In
terms of average household income, Beijing has slight smaller increase in average
income of 42% during the 5-year period while Tianjin has increase of 49%, with the
inflation being 13.7% during this period.
We rely on four main data sets together with a variety of axillary data for our
analysis. These data sets include information on 1) monthly new vehicle sales, 2)
model characteristics, 3) household survey data, and 4) annual income distributions
of cities.
The new vehicle sales data contains monthly sales by model (vintage-nameplate)
in each city from 2008 to 2012. There are 21,228 observations with 1,769 distinct
models9. Figure 2·2 plots monthly sales (in log) in each city. An important feature
observed from the plot is that sales grew in a consistent trend across cities before
2011. The sales increase in December 2011 appeared to be stronger in Beijing than
in Tianjin. This is due the anticipation and more importantly the fact the lottery
policy was announced in December 23, 2010 and taking effective on January 1, 2011.
Albeit on a short notice, many households have rushed to buy a car within the last
using both lottery and auction to allocate license.
8Beijing and Tianjin are two of the four province-level cities. They are at the same level of
administrative subdivision as provinces and are right below the central government.
9The data source is the Polk & co. (now a part of IHS) which provides market consulting services
for a variety of industries including the automobile industry across the globe
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week of December. Concerned that the anticipation effect and most importantly
announcement effects may distort our results, we run robust test by removing the
observations of last two months in 2010 and first month in 2011 in the empirical
analysis.
The model characteristics data contains important vehicle attributes of each model
that is available in the sales data. These characteristics include price, sales, size,
displacement, and vehicle segment10. Table 1 reports the variable statistic summary.
We summarize statistics at model-year-month level and segment-year-month level.
On average, the price is about 300K RMB for each model. The average price is
higher than average household income in both cities suggesting that forward looking
on future incomes are important to making a decision of buying a car. Note that
vehicle prices are computed based on the MSRP (manufacturer suggested retail price)
and the sales tax. The sales tax is normally set at 10% but was reduced to 5 and 7.5
percent for vehicles with engine displacement no more than 1.6 liter in 2009 and 2010,
respectively. We utilize the variation in sales tax rate across time and displacement
sizes in identifying the price coefficient.
MSRPs are set by manufacturers and are generally constant across locations and
within a model year. The actual transaction prices may also include dealers’ pro-
motions, which are not observable to researchers. Using MSRPs as price may under
estimate the competition level among retailers. However, Minimum RPM (retail price
maintenance) was a common practice in China during the sample period. Retailers
are not allowed to sell below the minimum prices. Therefore, MSRP is a good proxy
for the retailing price. In addition, our analysis uses MSRPs with the implicit assump-
tion that the allocation mechanisms in Beijing are not affecting firms’ nor dealers’
pricing strategies. Since the assumption is unlikely to be unrealistic due to the prac-
tice of Minimum RPM, our results should not be driven by the difference between
MSRP and actual retail price.
10The observed segments are mini, small, medium, upper medium, large and luxury cars.
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To better understand the dynamic feature of the market, we present selected
vehicle characteristics in Appendix Figure A·1. In general the plot displays three im-
portant features. First, average price was declining over years - from more than 340K
in 2008 to less than 290K in 2012. Second, choices of vehicle models are increasing
over years as there was 260 models available in 2008 while more than 380 models
available in 2012. Third, while vehicle sizes are increasing after 2010, fuel economy is
improving over time. This indicates that vehicles are more efficient in fuel use. Above
all, vehicle market evolution is significant in China as price is falling and quality is
improving. Canonical shows that in a durable good market as the one in our analysis,
many consumers would purposely delay their purchase. And when they do purchase,
consumers often have in mind that they will replace the model with a superior model
in the foreseeable future.
Income is the most important determinant in vehicle purchase decision. How-
ever, income data at household level in China is not publicly available. Instead, we
obtain income distribution in each city in each year by doing the following steps:
First, we obtain the average income by income quantiles in each city in each year
from the statistical yearbooks. Second, we use Chinese Household Income Survey
(2002)11, together with the aggregated income distribution information, to construct
the household income. We adjust the income in the household survey proportionally
and separately for each quantiles so that the interpolated income distribution in a
given year are consistent with the annual income statistics from the yearbooks.
We also obtain an additional household survey data that contains information
of car ownership and household demographics. The survey was conducted by the
National Information Center. The data has 1,332 observations in Beijing and 913
observation in Tianjin with rich information on vehicles that households currently
own including brand, model, registration date, whether or not was the first time
purchase, replaced car purchase year, etc. Since our analysis focus on vehicles buyers
11A national representative survey, conducted by researchers at the University of Michigan. It has
14,971 observations.
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who purchase a vehicle between 2008 to 2012, we retrieve 759 observations in Beijing
and 509 observations in Tianjin at last. Leveraging on the survey data we are able
to generate household shares by four income groups among new vehicles buyers in
each city in each year. Appendix Table 2a presents the shares along with the shares
of different income group among all households. The table shows that high income
groups account for a disproportionally large share of vehicle buyers. Since we are able
to tell replacement buyers from the household survey, we further decompose shares
in Appendix Table 2a to the shares of first time buyers and shares of replacement
buyers. This table shows a significant difference of income composition between first
time buyers and replacement buyers, which is crucial to identify consumer preference
parameters.
2.2.3 Evidence from Reduced-form Regressions
In this section, we examine the impact of the lottery policy through estimating the
following regression based on vehicle sales data in Beijing and Tianjin from 2008 to
2012.
ln(Smjt) = α1ln(pjt)+α2dT×ln(pjt)+γ1DBJ,T +γ2DBJ,T×ln(pjt)+dj+dt+dms+emtj,
(2.1)
where the dependent variable is the market shares in logarithm. The dummy
variable dT equals one for the post-policy periods and zeros otherwise, and DBJ,T is
the dummy for vehicle models that are affected by the lottery policy in Beijing. The
coefficients of interest, γ1 captures the sales impact of the lottery policy in Beijing. We
also interact the treatment with vehicle price, DBJ,T × ln(pjt) and let the coefficient
γ2 capture the heterogeneous policy impacts on vehicle sales. The model controls for
vehicle model (nameplate) fixed effects, dj and city-segment fixed effects ζms.
We estimate equation 2.1 and three other specifications, and present the results
in Table 2.1 (in first three columns). Specification 2 and 3 follow equation 2.1 while
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specification 1 drops the triple interaction term, DBJ,T × ln(pjt). We use the full
sample in specifications 1 and 2 and drops the data in the last two months of 2010 and
first month of 2011 in Beijing, in specification 3, to remove the anticipation effect and
more importantly the announcement effect in December 2010. In all specifications,
the base group is Tianjin and the base year is 2008.
By using the full sample, the first specification shows the lottery policy is esti-
mated to have reduced sales in Beijing by 60.8% in 2011 and 49.2% in 2012. This
implies that if were not the lottery policy, vehicle sales in Beijing would have been
approximately 210,000 in 2011 and 521,000 in 2012. In contrast, total lottery partici-
pations were over 180,000 in the first month of 2011 and has increased to over 820,000
by the end of 2011 and over 1.34 million by the end of 2012. The comparison be-
tween the counterfactual sales and observed lottery participations implies that lottery
participations have increased abnormally fast over periods and cannot be explained
by the increase in vehicle demand. Hence we take this reduced form regression as
evidence of early participation.
Specification 2 addresses the heterogeneity in treatment effects of the lottery pol-
icy. The estimate on the triple interaction term,DBJ,T × ln(pjt), is significantly differ-
ent from zero, indicating heterogeneous policy impacts on sales of vehicles in different
prices. Specifically, that the sign of this term is positive suggests that the sales of
expensive vehicles are less impacted by the policy than the sales of cheap vehicles.
This is consistent with the fact that wealthier households are more likely to partici-
pate who are also more likely to purchase the expensive vehicles. By considering the
heterogeneity in policy impact on sales, vehicle sales would have been approximately
285,000 in 2011 and 397,000 in 2012, which are still much less than the total lottery
participations in both years.
Our results above might be biased due to the anticipation effect or the announce-
ment effect. The lottery policy was announced on December 23, 2010 which was
in a week before the policy started. Although on a short notice, there were many
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households rushed to buy a car within that week, which drives the sales in December
of 2012 to the highest level relative to the past two years. In order to remove these
effects, we use specification 3 as a robust test by dropping the observations of the last
two months before and one month after the lottery policy started. This specification
produces estimations very close to specification 2, which implies that the findings are
not driven by the anticipation effect or the announcement effect.
Finally, we examine the validity of the common trend assumption.12 The equation
we estimate is very similar to equation 2.1 except that we replace those interactive
terms with city-year fixed effects and using the data from pre-policy periods only. The
last two columns of Table 2.2 show that coefficient estimates on city-year interactions
are small and insignificant, suggesting that the two cities share similar time trends.
In specification 5, we use instruments for the price variable and by doing this we
get a different estimate on price than that from specification 4. The estimates from
specification 4 imply a price elasticity of -5.238 while the estimates from specification
5 suggest -7.815. This is consistent with the observation that the correlation between
demand shock and price biases the price coefficient toward zero.
2.3 Model and Estimation
In this section, we first present our structural model of dynamic demand for both
licenses and vehicles. This model specifies how a household chooses to enter the lot-
tery and by vehicles based on its underlying characteristics. We then present our
estimation strategy for recovering both policy invariant and policy relevant parame-
ters which are subsequently used for counterfactual and welfare analysis.
We consider a structural model where the market has a finite amount of licenses
to be allocated and finite vehicle models available in each period. Vehicles are dif-
ferentiated in attributes while the licenses are identical. Vehicle characteristics and
12(Li, 2017) shows the validity of common trend assumption across four cities including Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanghai and Nanjing. We reexamine the assumption here by using the data of Beijing and
Tianjin only.
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availability are changing over time. Licenses are allocated via lottery. Each license
can be used to purchase one vehicle. Households discount future utilities at rate β,
and receive utility from at most one car in a period. License are not transferable. And
because we only focus on the sales of new vehicles, vehicle resales are not considered
in our model. 13
Our model separates households’ decision into two stages and assumes households
face a infinite-horizon dynamic decision problem in each stage. That is, a household
first chooses whether or not enter the lottery. If the household wins the lottery, it
then chooses a specific vehicle model to purchase. Formally, let J denote the set of
available vehicle models. The two-stage decision problem is stated as follows:
Stage I (Lottery Participation): A non-owner household decides whether or not to
enter the lottery; And before winning the lottery, it faces the same decision problem
in every period.
Stage II (Vehicle Buying): Conditioning on winning a license in Stage I, the
household chooses whether or not to buy a vehicle model,j ∈ J , or an outside option
(i.e., not purchasing).
We choose this two-stage model based on several policy realities. First, lottery
participants choose to enter the lottery based on their underlying characteristics and
leave the lottery pool after winning. And only lottery winners and existing vehicle
owners are eligible for purchasing a vehicle. This implies the composition of possible
lottery participants and potential market for vehicles are changing over time. Fail
to control for this selection will bias the estimates of vehicle qualities. Second, when
deciding whether or not to enter the lottery, households anticipate future utilities
of using the vehicle weighted on the chance of winning a license. Moreover, the
vehicle they will purchase after winning a license is either not currently available
or not of the same quality as the contemporaneous models. Ignoring this will lead
13In the lottery system of Beijing, license plates are non-transferable and can be used only by the
lottery winner. Abstracting away the resales is restrictive and only for simplification purpose. This
assumption implies a consumer will receive zero scrap value from replacing the old vehicle.
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to misspecified future utilities that enter into the WTP for license and affects the
degree of changes in lottery participation in response to the counterfactual changes
in vehicle qualities and model availability. Finally, households are forward looking
which means they choose the optional timing to enter the lottery. They also “time”
their purchases of a vehicle, i.e., delay purchase in anticipation of future quality or
price adjustment (Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012; Lee, 2013; Aguirregabiria and
Nevo, 2010). Falsely estimating such dynamic behavior by a static estimation can
yield not only biased price elasticities, but also biased WTP for licenses.
2.3.1 Dynamic Consumer Demand
In this subsection, we specify the lottery participation and vehicle purchase decisions
of one household and then discuss aggregating across heterogeneous households in the
next subsection.
The household starts as a non-owner. At the beginning of each period, the house-
hold chooses whether or not to enter the lottery. The lottery outcome reveals at the
end of each period. If the household wins a license at that period, it can start to
purchase a vehicle from the next period.
To formalize payoffs, we first specify the choices sets and state variables. At each
period t, the household chooses whether or not to enter the lottery in the first stage.
In the second stage, the household faces a choice set with Nt + 1 choices, where
Nt is total number of models that are available in period t denoted as Jt
14. Each
model has a net flow utility denoted as uijt and a disutility from price pjt. If the
household chooses to not purchase, it receives a utility of uikt, where the subscript k
denotes the model it currently owns (k ∈ ∪s<tJs ) or the outside option (k = 0). The
household also faces an information set that is relevant to its future payoffs. And the
information set can be separated into two groups. The first group has the information
on lottery allocations, i.e., variables that are affecting current and future expected
14Jt is the set of indices i.e. Jt = 1, · · · , Nt.
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winning probability, participation costs, etc. We use Φ to denote all state variables
in this group. The second group denoted as S is the information set that is relevant
to the maximization problem of vehicle purchasing. This group includes the number
of models, current product attributes and any other market characteristics that may
influence future model attributes. It also includes current household characteristics
such as the vehicle need and incomes.
The flow utility of the household’s decision problem in the first stage depends
on the state variables in Φ (e.g., the winning probability and participation cost),
and expected future utility received from purchasing a vehicle (therefore the state
variables in S). Denote the utility of entering the lottery as vi1t and not entering as
vi0t:
vi1t = Γ(V
0
it |Sit,Φit, γ0) + v¯t + ωi1, (2.2)
vi0t = ωi0 (2.3)
where v¯t is defined as
v¯t ≡ Zγ1 + ηt.
and Z and ηt are observed and unobserved characteristics of the lottery policy. Both
ωi0, ωi1 are idiosyncratic errors that are i.i.d across time and households, and they are
both type I extreme value distributed with a unity variance.
The expected utility a household receives from using a vehicle in the future is
embedded in V 0it , and Γ(·) is a function that maps the expected utility from vehicles to
utility of licenses. The function depends on all state variables in S and Φ. Parameters
γ0, γ1 also enter into the household’s utility in the first stage. We postpone the
specification of V 0it and Γ(·) after introducing the household’s dynamic decisions.
In the second stage, the household chooses whether or not to purchase a vehicle
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at each period. 15 Let Xjt and ξj denote observed and unobserved vehicle attributes,
respectively. The flow utility that a household receives from purchasing a vehicle
j ∈ Jt is:
uijt = u¯(νi, Xjt, ξjt, θvc) + κit + εijt, (2.4)
where u¯(·) is a deterministic component of utility as a function of consumer’s
demographics, νi, and the vector of parameters associated with consumer preferences,
θvc. As a departure from previous models, there are two idiosyncratic shocks additive
to the utility function and unobserved to econometricians - κit is discretely distributed
and serially correlated, while εijt is i.i.d. and following the type I extreme value
distribution with unit variance.
The demand shock, κit, is invariant across contemporaneous vehicle models but
persistently changes over time. It represents the necessity of possessing a vehicle to a
household, which has important implications for estimating the model: a household
self-selects to enter the lottery and purchase vehicles on the basis of the degree of
urgency to have a vehicle. Ignoring this can result into an overestimation of the
dependence of consumer utilities on vehicle characteristics. Moreover, the anticipation
on the persistent shock may be a significant part of households’ incentives of entering
the lottery. Failure to control this would lead to a biased the estimates of WTP for
licenses.
We further specify the function u¯ as:
u¯ijt = Xjtα
X
i + ξjt, (2.5)
where αXi is the individual taste of vehicle characteristics and it is a function of
unobserved household demographics captured by νi, which is assumed to follow a
standard normal distribution. Formally, αXi is written as:
15The existing vehicle owners enter the second stage directly, because they can regain the license
by scrapping their vehicles in possession.
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αXi = α¯
X + ΣXνi.
The household who chooses to not purchase any vehicle at time t receives uikt =
u¯ikt+ I(k 6= 0)κit+ εi0t,where u¯ikt represents the flow utility from the model currently
in possession, I(k 6= 0) is the indicator function and equal to 1 if k 6= 0, and εi0t is
the idiosyncratic error which is also i.i.d. across time periods and households, and
following the type I extreme value distribution with unit variance. If k = 0, the
flow utility u¯ikt = 0 or otherwise, the current flow utility u¯ikt is determined by the
characteristics of model k which is purchased in the past periods. That is, uikt is
defined as in equation 2.5 using Xkt = Xktˆ, where tˆ is the period that model k is
purchased.
Consider now the consumer dynamic optimization decision in both stages. At
time t, the household in the first stage decision faces a decisions of whether to enter
the lottery or wait until next period. The optimal decision, conditional on current
states, is given by the following value function:
EW (Si,Φi) = Emax
{
Γ(V 0i |Si,Φi, γ0) + Zγ1 + η + ωi1
βE [EW (S ′i,Φ′i)|Si,Φi] + ωi0
}
. (2.6)
In the second stage, a first-time buyer makes an optimal decision given its current
preferences, vehicle need, vehicle qualities and prices. A vehicle owner can make a
replacement decision based on the same information expect that its outside option is
the current vehicle model in possession. Formally, the life time utility of a household
i who possesses a vehicle k ∈ ∪s<tJs or the outside option k = 0 is defined by the
following value function:
EV (u¯ik, Si) = Emax
{
u¯ik + I(k 6= 0)κit + βE[EV (u¯ik, S ′i)|u¯ik, Si] + εi0,
max
j′∈Jt
uij − αPi ln(pj) + βE[EV (u¯ij, S ′i)|u¯ij, Si] + εij
}
(2.7)
where pj is the tax-inclusive price of product j and α
P
i denotes the individual
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disutility for price. Simt is the information set of a consumer that affect utility or
value of waiting. Specifically, it includes current individual characteristics such as the
vehicle need, κit and incomes, and market characteristics such as product attributes,
prices and product availability. A consumer’s distaste for price should be closely
related to her income level - higher (lower) income implies less (more) sensitivity of
price. Therefore, we define αit as:
αPit = α¯
P
0 + α¯
P
1 lnyit + σ
PνPi ,
where yit denotes the income level, ν
P
i has a standard normal distribution and
σP is the standard deviation. We are not using the same term of price preference
as in BLP and (Petrin, 2002) 16as median vehicle price in China are higher than the
average income of most households and the specification we use leads to an intuitive
pattern that more expensive products have less elastic demand (Li, 2017).
To reduce the computation burden from the large numbers of state variables in
equation 2.6 and 2.7, we further simplify the state space by defining two inclusive
values:
φi = Γ(V
0
i |Si,Φi, γ0) + Zγ1 + ηt. (2.8)
δi = ln
(∑
j∈Jt
exp(u¯ij + κi − αPit ln(pj) + βE[EV (u¯ij, S ′i)|u¯ij, Si])
)
. (2.9)
The inclusive value φit represents the expected utility received from entering the
lottery. The logit inclusive value,δit, is the maximum expected utility a household
will receive from buying one of the Jt vehicles. To replace state space by these two
inclusive variables, we follow GR, Schiraldi (2011) and Lee (2013) to assume that
φit, δit and κit are sufficient statistics for determining the probability distribution of
future individual preferences and market characteristics conditional on Sit and Φit.
16BLP and (Petrin, 2002) use ln(yi − pj) and interpret it as the utility from the composite good.
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Assumption 2. Consumers perceive that the pair of inclusive values (δit, φit) can be
summarized by a first-order Markov process:
G(δit+1, φit+1|Sit,Φit) = Gi(δit+1, φit+1|δit, φit).
This assumption helps to simply the dynamic decision problem in the first stage,
because both state variables in Sit and Φit in this stage can be replaced by the inclusive
values δit and φit. That is, instead of following the evolution of expected winning
probability, participation costs and vehicle market characteristics, the assumption 2
allows researchers only keep track of the market state δit and lottery state, φit. By
assumption 2 and equation 2.8, we can rewrite households’ expected value function
2.6 as follows:
EW (δit, φit) = log(exp(φit) + exp(βE [EW (δit+1, φit+1)|δit, φit]). (2.10)
In the second stage, only the information set Sit is pay-off relevant, but there is
an additional state variable κit that is relevant to the dynamic decision at this stage.
To reduce the number of state variables in this set, we make another assumption as
follows:
Assumption 3. Consumers in each market perceive that inclusive value δit and κit
can be summarized by a first-order Markov process:
F (κit+1, δit+1|Sit) = Fδi(κit+1, δit+1|κit, δit).
Similar to assumption 2, assumption 3 also helps to reduce the number of state
variables relevant to the dynamic decision in the second stage. Although there is no
proper supply model consistent with the assumption, GR notes that this assumption
can be considered approximating boundedly rational households who use only a subset
of the data potentially available to them in forming their expectation. By using
assumption 3 and equation 2.9, we can write the consumer’s expected value function
as:
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EVi(u¯ij, κit, δit) = ln(exp(δit) + exp(uijt + βE [EVi(u¯ij, κit+1, δit+1)|u¯ij, κit, δit])).
(2.11)
Now we turn to the specification of function Γ(·) that represents the general ben-
efits of lottery participation. It consists of two parts: (i) the expected utility received
from winning the lottery and purchasing a vehicle in the future, and (ii) the continu-
ation payoff received if the household does not win and stays in Stage I. The second
part of the utility has been defined in equation 2.10, since a household can enter the
lottery for multiple times before winning a license plate. We denote the first part of
the utility as V 0it and define Γit as:
Γit = pi
e
tV
0
it + (1− piet ) · βE [EW (φit+1, δit+1)|φit, δit] . (2.12)
where piet is the household’s expected probability of winning.
To define V 0it we impose the assumption that a lottery winner leaves the market
if she let the license plate expire. Hence the continuation payoff of the winner is zero
at the last period before license expiration. Based on the assumption, we define this
term as a finite sum of expected utilities of vehicles maximized over purchase choices:
V 0it ≡ max
at+1···at+T
γ0 ·
T∑
s=1
βsE [at+sδt+s|κit, δit] , (2.13)
where at+s is a binary variable representing the choice of purchasing at period t+s.
Parameter γ0 reflects how the household perceives the anticipated present-discounted
utilities receive from being able to purchase a vehicle. Unlike the discount factor β
which represents the level of patient and is always between 0 and 1, γ0 can be greater
than 1 as it measures the level of impatience when choose to enter the lottery or not.
Specifically, the household is impatient if γ0 > 1, as the option value of buying a
vehicle is inflated by the parameter in the utility received from entering the lottery.
In other words, the larger γ0 is, the more households will enter the lottery early even
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when they expect to receive a little from purchasing vehicles if winning a license. As
a result, the lottery mechanism hardly allocates the licenses efficiently. Therefore,
parameter γ0 affects the degree of dynamic inefficiency.
Although the magnitude of parameter γ0 plays an important role in predicting the
early lottery participations, it is not the only parameter in our model that helps us
to predict the degree of dynamic misallocation. In other word, even if the estimate
for γ0 is close to 1 (i.e., households choose to enter the lottery are as patiently as
they purchase a vehicle ), our model still can predict early participations. This is
because that both the inclusive value φit and the logit inclusive value δit depend on
the household’s future optimal decision making. For instances, it is implied in our
model that at period t, a household expecting a high δit+1 in foreseeable future is
more likely to enter the lottery at current period because, by the definition of V 0it , a
higher expectation on δit in the future will leads to a higher utility of participating.
2.3.2 Aggregation and Equilibrium
In this subsection, we discuss the aggregation of household choices. We present the
aggregation in vehicle purchases in two scenarios - with and without the lottery policy.
Then we discuss the probability of a consumer enter the lottery and the aggregated
lottery participation rate. Finally, we define the equilibrium of the market.
In each period t, the conditional probability that consumer i possessing vehicle
k ∈ ∪s<tJs ∪ {0} purchases a j ∈ Jt is
sjkit =
exp(uijt − αPit ln(pj) + βE[EV (u¯ijt, κit+1, δit+1)|u¯ijt, κit, δit])
exp(EV (u¯ikt, κit, δit))
. (2.14)
In the pre-policy periods, because the purchases are not constrained by the lottery
policy, the aggregation of vehicle demand follows BLP closely. That is, we integrate
the choice probability sjkit over the distribution of consumer preferences νi and vehicle
demand κi for each j ∈ ∪s<tJs ∪ {0}, and then sum over all existing vehicle models.
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Let Rkmt be the share of households owning model k (or non-owners if k = 0), the
market share of product j at time t is:
s¯t
j =
∑
k∈∪s<tJs∪{0}
Rkmt
∫
sjkit dP
k
v dP
k
κ , (2.15)
where P kν and P
k
κ are the density function of ν and κ conditional on the households
possessing vehicle model k or non-onwers (k = 0) at each period t, respectively.
In terms of aggregation under the lottery policy, we first need the aggregation indi-
vidual choice of entering the lottery into a lottery participation rate. For probability
that a household i enter the lottery is:
lit =
exp(φit)
exp(φit) + exp(βE[EW (φit+1, δit+1)|φit, δit]) . (2.16)
Because only the non-owners are required to enter the lottery before purchasing,
the potential lottery participants at the initial period of the lottery policy are all non-
owners. And the potential participants in the following periods are non-owners who
have not won a license in the past periods. Let R0t denote the ratio of potential lottery
participants to the total market size. The aggregate participation rate is obtained by
integrating over preferences of non-owners and their vehicle need κi, which is:
l¯t = R
0
t
∫
litdP
0
ν dP
0
κ . (2.17)
At each period t with the lottery policy, the market share of product j consists
of two parts - purchases from the lottery winners and replacement purchases from
existing owners. Since the existing owners have valid license plate hence their choice
probabilities are defined as in equation 2.14. For a lottery winner of period s, her
probability of buying a product j in period t is
sj0ist =
exp(uijt − αPit ln(pj) + βE[EV (u¯ijt, κit+1δit+1)|u¯ijt, κit, δit])
exp(δit) + exp(maxat+1···at+k
∑T−t+s
k=1 β
kE [at+kδt+k|κit, δit])
, (2.18)
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where T is the total length of validation periods of the license plate. Notice that
the difference between equation 2.14 and equation 2.18 is the denominator. Since
a lottery winner is required to apply the license plate to a vehicle within T period,
and leaves the market when the license plate expires, her continuation payoff in each
period, if she does not purchase a vehicle, is a finite sum of expected utilities of
vehicles maximized over choices of purchasing. Let R˜st denote the share of lottery
winners in period s who have not purchased a vehicle till period t, the aggregate
demand of product j at time t is:
s¯jmt =
t∑
s=t−T+1
R˜st
∫
sj0istdP
s0
ν dP
s0
κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
First−time Purchases
+
∑
k∈∪s<tJs
Rjt
∫
sjkimtdP
k
v dP
k
κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Replacement Purchases
, (2.19)
where P s0ν and P
s0
κ are the density function of ν and κ of winners from period s,
respectively.
The persistent demand shock, κit, is assumed to be binary, of which the lower
value is normalized to 0. The higher value of κit is parametrized by h. In each
period, a low-type household transits to a high type with the probability denoted as
Pi. The high-type household will stay as the high-type for the rest of periods. The
transition probability from the low type to high type varies by the household’s income
level, and it is defined as:
Pi∈g =
exp(c0 + c1,g)
1 + exp(c0 + c1,g)
, (2.20)
where the g is the index for the income group that household i belongs to. 17.
The definition of equilibrium for the vehicle market follows GR and Schiraldi
(2011). That is, we do not specify the supply of side explicitly except that we as-
sume vehicle characteristics evolve exogenously and new models become available
17We simulate household income by assuming the household staying in the same income group
for all periods. This assumption helps to simplify the dynamics of the model, as the transition
probability is fixed and known to each household and the transition process of κit is stationary.
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according to some exogenous processes. Firms set the price endogenously after seeing
consumers’ endowments and preferences, and prices are not affected by the lottery
policy. Formally, we assume that both inclusive values, δit and φit, evolve according
to the following AR(1) processes:
δit+1 = ϕi0 + ϕi1δit + ϕi2κit + ηit, (2.21)
φit+1 = ψi0 + ψi1φit + ψi2δit + ζit. (2.22)
where ηit and ζit are independent and normally distributed.
We define the equilibrium of lottery participation based on the conditions of ra-
tional expectation equilibrium. As implied in equation 2.12, potential lottery partici-
pants cannot observe the realized winning probability before participating. Therefore
we impose the rational expectation assumption such that households have common
belief on the probability of winning in each period and the expectation is consis-
tent with the realized winning probability. For the supply of licenses, we assume the
number of licenses issued according to an exogenous process.
2.3.3 Estimation and Computation
In this subsection, we first present an overview of our computation strategy. We
then provide a discussion on the intuitions of identification. The objective of estima-
tion is to recover the parameters of vehicle demand θvc ≡
{
α¯X , α¯P0 , α¯
P
1 ,Σ
X , σP
}
and
parameters of license demand θlc ≡ {γ0, γ1}.
Computation
As in BLP, our estimation relies on the unobserved characteristics ξjt and ηt. The
procedure of recovering those unobservables follows GR and Lee (2013) closely. The
former combines methodologies of Rust (1987), Berry (1994), and BLP; and the
latter introduces an estimation strategy that links different stages of the model and
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estimate both stages simultaneously. We also follow Pakes (1986) and Keane and
Wolpin (1997) by using the method that integrates unobserved state variable with
serial correlation by simulation.
To recover the unobservables during the pre-policy periods, we first obtain a start-
ing values for the mean utilities ujt ≡ Xjtα¯X + ξjt for a given set of parameters, and
then find the mean utilities that equalize the predicted market shares to observed
market shares via the contraction mapping method of BLP. For each iteration of
the contraction mapping, households’ beliefs over the evolution of the logit inclusive
value, δit, and the optimal purchase decisions are solved to determine the probability
of purchase conditional on vehicle need κit. Integration over κit involves solving an
integral over all possible histories of unobservables. To address the high dimension
integration, we use Monte Carlo simulations to approximate the integrals which is
firstly used in Pakes (1986). Specifically, we first draw a sequence of realizations of
κit for each households according to the transition process defined in equation 2.20 .
We then compute the individual probability of purchase for each history of κit and
take average over the simulations.
In policy periods, we first obtain initial values for individual participation cost
vt ≡ Zγ1 + ηt, and participation rate l0it which is the same across consumer types
and equal to the observed aggregate participation rate. Using the initial guess of
lit, we first estimate the vehicle purchase stage using the same procedure described
above. We then compute the values of Γit and use the contraction mapping algorithm
to recover utilities vt and update the individual participation rate l
n+1
it . Finally, we
fed ln+1it back into the second stage. We iterate between estimating the vehicle and
license plate adoption stages until both inclusive value φit and logit inclusive value
δit converge. Figure 2·3 shows an overview of the computation algorithm described
in detail above.
Since the dataset contains monthly vehicle sales of 1,769 distinct models (vintage-
nameplate) in each city from 2008 to 2012, we need to find mean utilities of over
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42,000 products. To reduce the computational burden, we categorize vehicles into
groups of segments18. Moreover, we set the sales of each segment to be the total sales
of vehicles in that group, use averaged value for the continuous characteristics (e.g.
price, engine displacement), and use the mode for the discrete characteristics (e.g.
seats, doors). Hereinafter, the index j is denoting a vehicle segment.
Moment Conditions
Following the literature, we estimate parameters using simulated GMM based on con-
ditional moments of unobserved characteristics. We allow unobserved characteristics,
ξjmt, to be time-varying. The first set of moments is formed by following Li (2017)
which assumes that demand shocks have common trend across cities and the common
trend is controlled by time fixed effect. Specifically, we separate ξjmt as follows:
ξjmt = ξj,yr + dt + djm + θmyrt + emtj, (2.23)
where ξj,yr is unobserved product characteristics that do not vary within a year
and across markets. The time and city-segment fixed effects, dt and djm, capture time-
invariant and city-specific preferences for different vehicle segments. The parameter
interacts with yrt, θm, captures city-specific time trends. Finally, emtj is the residual of
ξjt after controlling for these fixed effects and time trends. Since Beijing implemented
the lottery in 2011 and 2012 while Tianjin did not, this assumption implies that the
lottery policy is exogenous to the time-varying demand-shocks. Denote dmt as city-
year dummy variables, the first moment condition is:
E [emtj(θvc, θlc)|dmt] = 0. (2.24)
To address the price endogenity, an additional moment condition is generated that
is based on a tax policy to encourage the purchase of vehicles of small displacement.
The Chinese government provided purchase tax relief for vehicles with displacement
18The segments groups include large, luxury, medium, mini, small and upper medium.
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lower than 1.6L by 50% in 2009 and by 25% in 2010. The moment condition based
on this policy is:
E
[
emtj(θvc, θlc)|Z1.6jt
]
= 0, (2.25)
where Z1.6jt is equal to the number of vehicle models with displacement less than
1.6L in segment j and t ∈ {2009, 2010}.
The second set of moment conditions is constructed based on the aggregate infor-
mation from the household survey presented in the Appendix Table 2b. We match
predicted shares of households by income group by city among new vehicle buyers,
first time buyers and replacement buyers to those in the table. We set four income
groups and use the fourth group as the base group. The moment conditions are:
Et[s¯mgt(θlc, θvc)− smgt] = 0, (2.26)
where g is a index of income group and s¯mgt|X(θlc, θvc) is the predicted share of
income group g among vehicle buyers.
The last set of moment conditions is based on unobserved characteristics of lottery
mechanism, ηt. We assume ηt as a stochastic variable that follows an AR(1) process,
where the error terms
ςt = ηt − λ · ηt−1 (2.27)
are mean zero, independent, and
E [ςtZt] = 0 E [4ςt4Zt] = 0, (2.28)
where 4 is an operator of first difference and Z is a vector of instruments.19
19We use winning probability and vehicle characteristics as instruments in this moment.
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Identification
To achieve our goal of counterfactual and welfare analysis, we need correctly identify
those early lottery participants. However, Identifying the parameters of consumer
utility function in a dynamic model is a complex issue. In particular, identifying the
discount factor in a dynamic discrete choice model is notoriously difficult (Rust, 1994),
we do not attempt to estimate the discount factor in this study. We assume the same
discount factor in both stages and set β = 0.90. We also include the vehicle model
(segment) fixed effects that would subsume both unobserved product attributes and
household-invariant observed product attributes in the mean utility in equation 2.5.
The primary concern of the identification is twofold. First, we need use instrument to
address the price endogeneity and correctly identify the price coefficients. Second, we
need separately identify consumer heterogeneity on vehicle preference measured by
random coefficients in ΣX and parameters that are relevant to the persistent vehicle
demand shock κit and parameters of lottery participation using only market-level
data.
The first parameter on the price variable, α¯P0 , is identified by the additional mo-
ment defined in equation 2.25 that utilizes the tax discount policy as an instrument.
This policy is an exogenous shock that affects consumer’s utility only through vehicle
prices and hence we use this feature to deal with price endogeneity. The heterogeneity
in consumer price sensitivity over income levels, α¯P1 , is identified by micro-moments.
Table 2a illustrates that high income groups accounts for disproportionally larger
shares among new vehicle buyers, implying a positive estimate for this coefficient.
Parameters of the persistent shock κit are identified from the difference in income
composition between the first time and replacement buyers. Note that κit is invariant
across contemporaneous models and only enters into non-owners’ utilities if a vehicle
is purchased; whereas for owners, κit always enters into their utilities regardless of
their choices. Thus, κit can only affects the degree of non-owners substitute between
purchase or not purchase a vehicle in response to changes in their incomes. When
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κit is large, non-owners would choose to purchase more likely even when their income
is low, while it has no impact on replacement purchases, and we should observed
large difference in income distributions between the first-time buyers and replacement
buyers. If income plays an equal important rule in new and repeat purchases, i.e.
income composition of the first-time and replacement buyers are similar, κit is small.
Another source of identifying the parameters is using time series variation in vehicle
sales. When κit transits to a high value with substantial probability, which mean
a great proportion of households would become urgent buyers at the early periods,
we should observe more rapid growth of vehicle sales in the early periods than the
later. On the contrary, a relative smooth vehicle sales growth would indicate that the
transition probability that κit transits to the high is relative small.
The identification of γ0 in equation 2.13 comes from two sources. The first source
of identification comes from the variation in participation rates and varying qualities
of vehicles in the market. That is, γ0 is identified from the influence of variations
in observed availabilities and estimated vehicle qualities within the next T periods
on households’ lottery participations. The second source is the ratio of first time
purchases to the replacement purchases within the policy period. If γ0 is large, the
model predicts that, because consumers are more impatient in the first stage, house-
holds with lower expectation on δit+1 will choose to enter the lottery who are less
likely to purchase even if they win the license. Thus, the model has to predict more
replacement purchases.
Finally, we address the concern of identifying the repeat purchases. We utilize two
additional moments based on the household incomes of first time and replacement
purchases drawn from the survey data to address this issue. The moments are min-
imizing the difference between income distribution observed in the household survey
data and as predicted by the model. Although we do not include the penetration data
that is used in GR, we believe using the micro-moment described above is identify the
repeat purchase behavior. Heuristically the difference in income range between the
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first-time and replacement buyers would identify the ratio of first-time to replacement
purchases.
2.4 Estimation Results
We first present the parameters estimates from the structural model, then we show
the robustness check and discuss the implication of the results.
2.4.1 Parameter Estimates from the Dynamic Demand
Table 2.3 reports the results for the structural model. The first panel of the table
corresponds to parameters in θvc, which appear in consumer-specific utility function
in equation 2.4. We do not report the parameters of mean utilities as they are
not needed for policy simulations and welfare analysis. The second panel reports
parameter estimates for γ0 which is the parameter of license plate valuation defined
in equation 2.13. The last panel presents the parameters of the persistent idiosyncratic
shocks of vehicle need, in which h represents the high level of vehicle need and the
estimated probability that κit transits from low to high which is defined in equation
2.20.
We present the structural parameters in five specifications based on different as-
sumptions and estimation strategy. In the first specification, we estimate coefficients
using all the moments described in previous section and set income coefficients cg in
equation 2.20 to zeros. In the second specification we exclude the micro moments
constructed through the incomes of replacement buyers. Specification 3 drops the
observations in Nov. and Dec. of 2010 and Jan. of 2011 for Beijing to remove the
anticipation effect as we did in the reduced form analysis. Specification 4 assumes
away the persistent shock to vehicle demand. Specification 5 relax the assumption
that coefficients cg in equation 2.20 are zeros hence the transition probability of the
persistent shock of demand is allowed to vary across different income levels. We take
specification 1 as our baseline model on which the counterfactual simulations are
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based and the other specifications serve as robustness checks.
In the baseline model, the coefficient estimate on ln(price) is significantly neg-
ative, while the coefficient estimate on interaction between this price variable and
ln(income) and that on income variable alone are both positive. This suggests that
all households dislike higher prices, whereas those with a higher income are less price
sensitive. In addition, the inclusion of ln(income) in the utility function allows the
difference between a new vehicle and the outside option to differ by income. A posi-
tive coefficient on this variable implies that the likelihood that a consumer purchases
a new vehicle increases with income.
We include two random coefficients into our model, one on price and the other on
the constant term. The last two coefficient estimates in the first panel are standard
deviations of random coefficients for ln(price) and constant which capture households’
heterogeneous preferences. Both estimates are significant in specifications 1 and the
estimated parameter on constant term is large in magnitude which indicates more
variation in the flow utility from a vehicle.
In the second panel, the coefficient estimate on the parameter, γ0, is 19.68 in
specification 1 which is significantly greater than 1. This indicates that households
are extremely impatient when deciding to participate in the lottery. As described in
the earlier section, the magnitude of dynamic misallocation loss is largely depending
on whether γ0 has a large value. The estimate of γ0 shows that the issue of dynamic
misallocation is not negligible.
In the last panel, the estimate of h is 2.70 and the estimated transition probability
is 5%. Given the average flow utility of vehicles is estimated to be around 1.5, the
shock to the vehicle need is significantly large relative to the utility of vehicle. Thus
our model captures two groups of the first time purchases. The first group of first
time purchases comes from households who care more about the product quality and
less about the price; the second group is the purchases made by households who care
less about the product quality and more price sensitive whereas they choose to buy a
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vehicle as they receive additional utility in excess of the product characteristics and
price (e.g. a change in working location to the suburban area of the city).
Column 2 provides estimates from the dynamic model where the micro moments
for income distribution of first time and replacement buyers are excluded. We find
that, by comparing to the baseline specification, the transition probability of the per-
sistent shock κit is not changed and the estimate for h is slightly changed. This implies
that those parameters are still identified without the micro moments. Excluding those
micro moments also changes estimates for γ0, as one of the identification source of
this parameter is the ratio of first time purchases to the replacement purchases that
is controlled by the micro moments.
The estimation results from specification 3, in which we dropped observations of
the last two months before and one months after the policy starts, is very similar
to our baseline estimations. Therefore, we find that the anticipation effect and the
announcement effect are less significant in affecting our main conclusions drawn from
the estimation results.
Column 4 shows the estimates from dynamic model where the persistent shock is
assumed away. Since the heterogeneity of vehicle need is missing, variation in price
sensitivity across income levels is increased in this specification. However, the stan-
dard deviation of random coefficient for constant term is smaller than our baseline
estimation. This is because in order to match the difference in income distribution
between the first time and replacement buyers, the model increases the repeat pur-
chases from households with low disutility of price and decreases the set of households
who care more about model features that improve over time.
The last column provides transition probabilities of the persistent shock across
different income level. We find this specification yields less appealing results than our
baseline specification. Except for the second income group, all transition probabilities
are insignificant from zero. In addition, standard errors for the rest parameters are
also elevated in this specification. Therefore, although it is more reasonable to let
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the transition probability of persistent shock vary across incomes, this specification
is less identified and we choose specification 1 as our baseline model.
2.4.2 Price Elasticities
We calculate the dynamic price elasticities based on the first specification. We com-
pute sales changes under scenarios of permanent and temporary price change, assum-
ing that households know whether the price change is temporary or permanent. For
the temporary price change, we compute the expectation on δit+1, φit+1 and κit+1
using the baseline δit, φit and κit in equation 2.21 and 2.22; for the permanent price
change, we use realized δit, φit and κit. We also assume that the future states of
vehicle characteristics including prices, the lottery policy and value functions evolve
identically in both scenarios, conditional on δit, φit and κit.
We compare the effects of both temporary and permanent price changes over
six segments. Figure 2·4 shows the percentage changes of sales of each segment in
May 2011. Sales of luxury models drop by 10.73% in response to both temporary
and permanent 1% increase in price, which is the largest among segments. The
medium segment has the smallest response to the temporary 1% increase in price
which is 8.19% decrease in sales. The mini segment have the smallest response to the
permanent 1% increase in price which is 2.38% decrease in sales. Mini segment is the
only one with the permanent elasticities being significantly less than the transitory
elasticities in magnitude. This indicates that when only mini vehicles temporarily
increase the price in the market, buyers choose to delay their purchase rather than
switch to purchase the vehicles in other segments.
The elasticities we obtained are higher than the estimates of U.S. market which is
ranging from -3 to -8.4 (Berry et al., 1995; Goldberg, 1995; Petrin, 2002; Beresteanu
and Li, 2011) This is consistent with what we expect as the income level in Beijing and
Tianjin is one half less than U.S. income from 1981 to 1993 which is the data period
used in Petrin (2002), and vehicle prices in China are much higher than the prices
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in the U.S. for the same brand. However, our elasticity estimates are lower than the
estimates of static model which is -10.51 on average and ranging from -8.70 to -15.97
as in Li (2017). There are at least two reasons for the difference. First, we estimate
the model at the vehicle segment level, and the segment price and market share are
calculated via the average model price and sales within each segment. Within-segment
substitution is not captured in our estimates, hence the elasticity estimations are lower
in our paper. Second, static model might overestimate the own-price elasticity. This
is because a static model does not account for consumers’ forward looking behaviors
and ignores the fact that consumers who previously purchased a vehicle are having
different values of the outside option. For instance, as the key dynamics in the data
is price declining, consumers might find it optimal to delay their purchases or buy
an inferior option only to replace it shortly thereafter. A static model would mis-
attribute those temporal considerations of consumers to price sensitivity and thus
overestimate the own elasticities.
2.4.3 Other Implications of Results
To examine the sources of heterogeneity, we plot the evolution of the log inclusive
value, δit. Figure 2·5 depicts δit from the first specification for six sets of consumers
with random coefficients at different percentiles of the population. Specifically, we
set draws for price and constant at the 25-25, 75-75 and 25-75 percentiles of their
respective distributions and the persistent idiosyncratic shock, κ , at the low and
high level.
For each set of consumers, the value of the logit inclusive value is increasing over
time indicating that households are expecting the vehicle market to improve for the
foreseeable future. There is slight trend change in the value of all consumers during
the policy period and the value varies close to linearly before and after the break
point. There are many reasons for this structural break including both behavioral
and rational explanations as we have discussed in the reduced form analysis when
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lower price elasticities are observed during the policy period.
When κ is fixed, the value that the 25-25 consumer places on the market is far
below than the values of 75-75 and 25-75 consumers, while the value that 25-75
consumer place on the market is very close to the value of 75-75 consumer. That
is, heterogeneity in price sensitivity of households creates less variation in the logit
inclusive value than heterogeneity in the flow utilities from the product. Again, this
indicates that heterogeneity in the constant term is more important.
It is also worth noting that the line with higher value in κ but smaller constant
draws evolves above lines with larger constant draws but lower value in κ before
June 2011. That indicates before June 2011, households receiving large shock in
their vehicle need have higher likelihood of purchasing a vehicle than households
impacted less from the same shock. Since κ is a stochastic term that varies over
time and representing the additional utilities that a household receive in excessive
to the vehicle qualities, the relationship of these two lines indicates that our model
captures two group of households who will make the first time purchases: the first
group is the households who care more about the product quality and less about the
price; the second group is the households who care less about the product quality and
more price sensitive whereas they choose to buy a vehicle because of other exogenous
reasons (e.g. a change in working location or increase in family size).
Figure 2·6 plots the evolution of the inclusive value, φit. We set the coefficient
on price and the constant term at the same percent as in the plot of log inclusive
value,δit, except for the 25-75 line. Lines are increasing, albeit slowly, overtime as the
market of vehicles is improving and so as to the valuation of license plate. Compared
to lines of δit, values of φit are less heterogeneous. Also lines are compressing overtime
and differences between lines are converging to zero by the end of the sample. These
features are intuitive as the winning probability is low and decreasing over time.
That is, values that different households place on the lottery, which depends on the
product between the winning probability and the expected payoff from purchasing,
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is decreasing as well.
We further investigate the assumptions on transitions of the state variables. Figure
2·7 and 2·8 plot the prediction errors of φit and δit respectively for a consumer with
draws in the 50th percentile for both random coefficients. From the graphs, we find
neither the serial correlation nor the variance changes over time. One concern is that
AR(1) process may not be a good approximation to the process of φit and δit. To
verify that, we run the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations tests which are
plotted in Figure 2·9 and 2·10 separately for both values and find no evidence showing
inconsistency to our AR(1) assumption.
Finally, we study the impact of lottery policy on vehicle sales. Table 2.4 presents
the simulated sales under counterfactual environment of no lottery policy for the
baseline specification and two other alternative specifications. For the baseline spec-
ification, the counterfactual sales in Beijing are 1,545,920 in 2011 and 2,713,106 in
2012, relative to observed sales which are 326,769 and 504,990 under the policy. This
suggests that lottery policy reduced sales by 79 and 81 percent, respectively in 2011
and 2012. Figure 2·11 plots the percentage of households making a purchase ob-
served in the data and the counterfactual estimates in the absence of the lottery
policy from January 2008 to December 2012 using the baseline specification. The
estimated percentage of households making a purchase matches closely to the data
during the pre-policy period, suggesting a good model fit.
The alternative models predict similar simulated sales impact. The alternative
specification 1 that drops observations in Nov. and Dec. of 2010 and Jan. of 2011,
predicts sales would be 1,439,799 in 2011 and 2,763,872 in 2012 in absence of the lot-
tery policy. Under the model (alternative specification 2) that corresponds to model
allowing the transition probability of the persistent shock to be income variant, pre-
dicts the counterfactual sales without the lottery policy in Beijing are 1,368,790 and
2,528,586, respectively in 2011 and 2012. Although the parameters of the persistent
shock in alternative specification 2 are not well identified, the model still predicts
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similar sales impact as the baseline model. This is because the policy impacts are
mainly identified through the first set of moment conditions that utilize common
trend assumption.
The sales reduction estimates are larger than what we estimated from the reduced
form regressions. This is because using a dynamic model addresses accelerated par-
ticipations and purchases influenced by the lottery policy, hence it is sensible that
counterfactual prediction of the structural estimation is different from that of the
reduced form estimation. To justify that the policy accelerates participations and
purchases, we do the counterfactual analyses in the next section to demonstrate the
evidence of dynamic misallocation.
2.5 Counterfactual Simulations
We consider two counterfactual scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that the
lottery policy starts unexpectedly from the first month of the sample period. In the
second scenario, we assume the lottery policy is absent during the sample period. In
both scenarios we simulate households’ decisions on lottery participation and vehicle
purchase separately 20. All consumers are assumed to be the non-owners from the
beginning period in both scenarios. We then use the same market quality and con-
sumer preferences as in the data and estimations, and simulate participation costs by
using equation 2.27. We set the winning probability at 1.38 percent and assume the
winning probability to be constant over periods.21 All reported results are based on
the parameter estimates from the baseline specification and for Beijing only.
The simulation result shows that our model is able to replicate the drastic increase
in lottery participations compared to the increase in vehicle sales in the absence of
the lottery policy. Table 5a shows that around 50 percent of total households on
20Independent of the estimation, we separately generate 2000 households without owning a vehicle
from the beginning. Each household is characterized by a vector of income and random draws of
unobserved household attributes. For each consumer, we draw a vector of 200 idiosyncratic errors.
21We fit the winning probability via an AR(1) process and the constant term is estimated as 1.38
percent.
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average enter the lottery for getting a license in each month, while in the absence of
the lottery policy, the monthly average share of first time vehicle buyers is less than
1 percent from 2008 to 2011 and less than 3 percent in 2012.
To examine the extent to which the lottery policy had induced households to
enter the lottery pool early, we look into households’ first time lottery participations
and first time purchasing. Table 5b shows that if lottery started from 2008, most
households enter the lottery for the first time within the first quarter of that year,
while most of them would not choose to purchase a vehicle within five years in the
absence of quantity constraint. To graphically illustrate the difference, we plot a
histogram of duration before the first time lottery participation and vehicle purchasing
over households in Figure 2·12. On average, households move forward their market
participation for at least four years. The winning probability used in simulations also
indicates that a lottery participant is expected to wait for 6 years before winning the
license plate. Forward-looking households who plan to buy a vehicle within 6 years
are likely to join the lottery pool much earlier than when they want to buy a vehicle
as the expected waiting time to win a license plate is long.
Figure 2·13 shows simulation results of lottery participations, vehicle ownership
and sales with and without the lottery policy. The lottery policy reduces both vehicle
sales and ownership significantly - about 85% of monthly sales are reduced by the lot-
tery policy on average Accumulated lottery participations - the fraction of households
that have entered the lottery before- increases rapidly and dominates the increase of
vehicle ownership in the absence of the quantity constraint. The difference between
the two lines is driven by the accelerated participation, revealing the existence of
dynamic misallocation. The area between two lines indicates significance of dynamic
inefficiency - the larger the difference between these two lines, the larger the dynamic
misallocation is. Figure 2·14 provides a matrix of plots that are separated by groups
with different preferences. Both coefficients on price and the constant term are cate-
gorized into four groups which are below 25, 25-50, 50-75 and above 75 percent. The
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coefficient on price increases from top to bottom, and the constant terms increases
from left to right. The dynamic misallocation takes places more severely in the lower
preference group than the higher group as the difference between two lines shrinks
as the preference becomes stronger. This is consistent with what we observe in the
previous section that households valuation of license plate is less heterogeneous than
that of vehicles. The line of lottery participation is slightly different across groups
while the line of ownership shifts upward significantly with the increase of the coef-
ficients. The constant term is more important as it has more notable impact on car
ownership.
Figure 2·15 demonstrates an accelerated purchase timing that households exhibit
under the influence of the quota system. The figure shows a histogram of the difference
in households’ timing decisions on purchasing with and without the lottery policy.
As the lottery policy generally delays household purchases, we only focus on lottery
winners who get a license plate before they would purchase a vehicle in the absence of
the lottery policy. The figure shows that distribution of timing difference is shifting
to the right with the median being three. This indicates that more than half of the
lottery winners would buy a vehicle more than 3 months earlier than they would in
the absence of the policy. In fact, around 80 percent of the lottery winners advance
their purchases more than one month.
2.6 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we use our structural estimates to examine how the lottery policy
affects consumer welfare. Since consumer welfare is inevitably impaired by the quan-
tity constraint, we focus on attributing welfare loss under the lottery policy to three
causes22: static misallocation, dynamic misallocation and early purchasing. By doing
this we are able to answer the question whether or not dynamic inefficiency accounts
22Neither do we consider the external costs associated with automobile usage in the sense of Li
(2017) in this paper.
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for significant part of total welfare loss caused by the lottery policy.
We simulate households’ behavior of acquiring a license plate and purchasing a
vehicle in both year 2011 and 2012 under the following three allocation scenarios:
(i) First-best allocation, in which licenses are allocated to the households with the
highest valuations. In this scenario, licenses are efficiently allocated hence neither
static nor dynamic inefficiency exits. In theory, the first-best scenario is achievable
through an auction system hence one can take welfare analysis in this scenario to
compare welfare difference between lottery and auction system. 23
(ii) Second-best allocation, in which licenses are allocated in a uniform probability
among households who would purchase a vehicle in the absence of the lottery pol-
icy. In this scenario, allocation is inefficient in the sense that licenses might not be
allocated to households with the highest valuations. Since the misallocation here is
static in natural, the difference between the welfare of the first scenario and that of
the second scenario is attributed to static misallocation.
(iii) Random allocation. In this scenario, license are allocated via the lottery
system. As shown in the previous sections, using a lottery system will not only
misallocate license to households with lower valuation, but also induce households
to move forward their market participation which exacerbate the misallocation loss.
Therefore, more welfare loss aroused in this scenario relative to the welfare loss in
the second-best scenario. We then take the additional welfare loss in this scenario
as dynamic inefficiency. Moreover, as lottery winners are requested to purchase a
vehicle within a finite period before the license expires. A winner who let the license
expire is not allowed to re-enter the lottery within three years. Which is shown
23Although it is not the focus of this paper, we doubt that the classical auction system would
be able to reach the efficiency for the following reasons: First, households may subject to budget
constraints, in which sense the auction system is unfair as only the “rich” can drive on the road;
Second, in practice auction process usually last for hours (see the example of Shanghai license plate
auction) and hence dynamic. This dynamic feature arouses many difficulties to achieve efficiency as
bidders are able to submit multiple bids or snipe; Finally, as transfer is usually allowed in a auction
system, license plate is no longer a private value good. In that case, bidders are likely to shield to
avoid the winner’s curse.
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in the counterfactual analysis, this policy drives lottery winners to move forward
their purchases. The expiration rule by preventing households from choosing the
optimal timing of purchasing is a detriment to consumer welfare. In order to separate
the dynamic inefficiency generated by advanced purchasing from the total welfare
loss, we simulate both purchasing decisions that are subject to the expiration rule
and purchasing decisions without any constraint. By comparing welfare outcomes
from these two simulations, we are able to quantify the welfare loss caused by early
purchasing.
We identify an early participant by comparing the time that a household enters
the lottery under the lottery policy and the time that the same household chooses
to buy a vehicle for the first time with no policy. Similarly, an early purchase is
identified through the difference in time that a household starts to own a vehicle
between the scenarios of with and without the lottery policy. Table 2.6 reports
the summary statistics of early participations and advanced purchases identified via
simulation. Specifically, around 79 percent in 2011 and 40 percent in 2012 of total
households that enter the lottery were early participants, and on average they moved
forward their market participation for at least 8 months in 2011 and 4 months in
2012. 24This suggests lottery policy are more likely allocating the licenses to early
participants than to non-early participants, and needless to say, to the households
with the highest valuation. Therefore, welfare loss due to dynamic misallocation
should be large relative to the loss caused by static misallocation. When it comes to
the early purchases, around 39 percent of total purchases in 2011 were moved forward
and it decreased to 33 percent in 2012. Households moved forward their purchases
24Note that we are unable to simulate households’ purchase decisions in absence of the lottery
policy after 2012 due to the data limits. But we observe almost 50 percent of households were still
non-owners by the end of 2012, while many of them have entered the lottery before. For those
households, we only know the months they have moved forward to participate is at least the time
of participation till the end of 2012, which is a very conservative estimate. In the counterfactual
analysis, however, we retrieved a less conservative estimate that at least four years that households
have moved forward their market participation in the counterfactual environment that the lottery
policy started from 2008.
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by at least 3 months and 2 months on average in 2011 and 2012, respectively.
We then calculate the (expected) consumer surplus for consumers who are pre-
dicted to purchase a vehicle in each scenarios:
CS =
∑
i,j,t
E
[
max
j∈Jt
u¯ijt + κit − αPit ln(pjt) + βE[EV (u¯ijt, S ′i)|u¯ijt, Si] + ijt
αPit/pjt
]
, (2.29)
where ijt is the idiosyncratic error term conditional on purchasing model j. And
finally, we decompose welfare loss into inefficiencies generated by the static misallo-
cation, dynamic misallocation and early purchasing.
Table 2.7 presents the simulated welfare for the three scenarios described above
in year 2011 and 2012. By allocating the license plate optimally in the first scenario,
the total consumer surplus would have been 16.5 and 24.4 Trillion RMB in 2011 and
2012. About 92.3 percent (15.2 Trillion RMB) and 99.6 percent (24.3 Trillion RMB)
of consumer surplus in the first scenario in 2011 and 2012 would have been realized in
the second scenario, while only 57.0 percent (9.3 Trillion RMB) and 74.2 percent (18
Trillion RMB) are realized in these two years under the lottery policy. These results
highlight the significance of dynamic misallocation of lottery mechanism. Specifically,
lottery policy generates a total loss of 7.1 and 6.3 Trillion RMB in consumer welfare
in year 2011 and 2012. Around 18.0 and 1.7 percent of the total loss are attributed to
static misallocation, respectively in 2011 and 2012. Thus dynamic inefficiency (losses
generated by both dynamic misallocation and early purchasing) accounts for the
majority of the total welfare losses which are 82.0 percent in 2011 and 98.3 percent in
2012. Within the dynamic inefficiency, dynamic misallocation generates more losses
than early purchasing. In both year 2011 and 2012, dynamic misallocation caused
losses more than 3 Trillion RMB in consumer welfare, while early purchasing caused
2.0 and 1.0 Trillion RMB losses.
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2.7 Conclusion
Using lotteries to allocate resources could lead to misallocation and welfare loss due
to its inability to match the resource with consumers with the highest willingness
to pay (WTP). The empirical analysis has largely focused on the misallocation in a
static setting. When the resource is durable in nature and consumers are forward
looking, lotteries could induce consumers to move ahead their participation decision,
leading to a large pool of participants. This change in participation timing represents
dynamic inefficiency and another channel of welfare loss.
This paper provides to our knowledge the first empirical analysis on the misallo-
cation and welfare loss from lotteries in a dynamic setting by examining the vehicle
license lottery in Beijing. The analysis suggests that consumers on average partici-
pate the lottery four years earlier than their optimal timing of vehicle purchase in the
absence of the policy. Dynamic inefficiency from policy-induced change of purchasing
timing accounts for the majority of the welfare loss from misallocation. The finding
highlights the importance of taking into account consumer forward-looking behavior
in the design of allocation mechanisms of durable resources.
Several cities in China have adopted vehicle purchase restrictions and more are
considering this policy as a strategy to address the worsening traffic congestion and
air pollution in urban areas. Economic theory suggests that the blunt instrument
such as the purchase restriction would not be the first best policy to correct the
externalities associated with the automobile usage and that the Pigouvian tax such as
congestion pricing that directly targets the externality-generating activities is likely to
be more efficient. Even if the purchase restriction framework was the most politically
feasible, different allocation mechanisms could result in dramatically different welfare
consequences. The lottery policy could lead to large welfare loss due to its impact
on consumer purchasing timing as is evident in the large pool of lottery participants
and the nearly impossible winning odds in Beijing.
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Figure 2·1: Probability of Winning the Lottery 2011-2017
Notes: The y-axis indicates the probability of winning a license. The lottery was
held once every month from 2011 to 2013 and then changed to bimonthly from 2014.
In 2011 and 2012 about 20,000 license plates are distributed in each month and the
annual cap was reduced over time to 150,000 in 2017.
95
Figure 2·2: New Vehicle Monthly Sales (in logarithm) of Cities 2008-2012
Notes: The y-axis indicates monthly sales (in logarithm) of vehicles. The monthly sales is retrieved by aggregating sales
across all vehicle models available in that period.
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Figure 2·3: Estimation Algorithm
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Notes: Computation algorithm for estimation of consumer demand. “BLP Con-
traction” refers to the contraction mapping introduced in Berry et al. (1995).
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Figure 2·4: Dynamic Price Elasticities for Segments
Notes: Elasticities are calculated by the percentage change of segment sales when
price is increased at time t, and is unexpected before then. We assume consumers at
time t know that the temporary price increase is temporary and that the permanent
price increase is permanent. We set the time t to the median period of data sample
which is May 2011.
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Figure 2·5: Evolution of log inclusive value δit
Notes: The y-axis indicates the value of log inclusive value δit. The six sets of log inclusive values plotted in the figure are
corresponding to six groups of consumers with draws for price and constant at the 25-25, 75-75 and 25-75 percentiles of their
respective distributions and the persistent shock, κ, at the low and high level.
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Figure 2·6: Evolution of inclusive value φit
Note: The y-axis on the left indicates the value of log inclusive value δit and inclusive value φit. Values of two groups of
consumers with draws for price and constant at the 25-25 and 75-75 percentiles of their respective distributions and their
persistent shock,κ, is fixed at the high level. The y-axis on the right indicates the difference of the inclusive value φit between
consumers of 25-25 and 75-75.
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Figure 2·7: Prediction Errors of δit
Notes: The y-axis indicates the prediction errors of the log inclusive value δit. The prediction error is calculated by the
difference between δit+1 and the period t prediction of this value using the realized δit and fitted AR(1) model, for a
consumer with draws in the 50th percentile for both random coefficients and κit at the high level.
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Figure 2·8: Prediction Errors of φit
Notes: The y-axis indicates the prediction errors of the inclusive value phiit . The prediction error is calculated by the
difference between φit+1 and the period t prediction of this value using the realized δit,φit and fitted AR(1) model, for a
consumer with draws in the 50th percentile for both random coefficients and κit at the high level.
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Figure 2·9: Autocorrelation Test of Prediction Error of δit
Notes: The y-axis in the top panel indicates sample auto correlation of prediction error of δit and the y-axis of the bottom
panel indicates sample partial correlation of prediction error of δit. The confidence bound is calculated by one unit of standard
error, 1/
√
T , where T equals to 59 months.
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Figure 2·10: Autocorrelation Test of Prediction Error of φit
Notes: The y-axis in the top panel indicates sample auto correlation of prediction error of φit and the y-axis of the bottom
panel indicates sample partial correlation of prediction error of φit. The confidence bound is calculated by one unit of
standard error, 1/
√
T , where T equals to 23 months.
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Figure 2·11: Sales Impact of the Lottery Policy
Notes: The y-axis indicates fraction of households purchasing a vehicle. The grey band around counterfactual purchases line
is the 90% confidence band. The confidence band is calculated by bootstrapping.
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Figure 2·12: Households Timing Decisions
Notes: The x-axis indicates months before a household enters the lottery or start to own a vehicle.The y-axis indicates
fraction of total households that start to enter the lottery or own a vehicle in that month. The histogram is truncated at the
60th month beyond which we are unable to simulate households’ decisions due the data limits.
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Figure 2·13: Counterfactual Simulation Results
Notes: The y-axis on th left indicates fraction of households that have owned a vehicle (Ownership) or has entered the lottery
before (Accumulated Lottery Participations). The y-axis on the right indicates vehicle sales or lottery participations (in
logarithm).
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Figure 2·14: Counterfactual Results by Preferences
Notes: The y-axis indicates fraction of households that have owned a vehicle (Ownership) or has entered the lottery before
(Accumulated Lottery Participations). From the top to bottom, draw on price coefficient increases. From the left to right,
draw on constant term increases.
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Figure 2·15: Difference in Purchase Timing with and without the Policy
Notes: The y-axis indicates fraction of lottery winners. The x-axis indicates the time that a households starts to own a
vehicle in absence of quantity constraint minus the time a households purchase a vehicle for the first time under the lottery
policy. Positive values in x-axis represent early purchases.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Model Segement
Price 311.29 277.83 36.49 1148.40 391.26 308.42 56.56 912.45
Monthly sales in Beijing 125.82 240.72 0.00 3464.00 7425.72 8355.43 103.00 62160.00
Monthly sales in Tianjin 57.19 125.81 0.00 2295.00 3380.83 3870.01 15.00 17435.00
Vehicle size (m2) 8.01 1.01 4.20 10.97 7.84 1.33 5.37 9.20
Displacement (liter) 2.11 0.85 0.90 6.20 2.35 1.09 1.04 4.32
Mini dummy 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.3732 0.00 1.00
Small dummy 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.3732 0.00 1.00
Medium dummy 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.3732 0.00 1.00
Upper Medium dummy 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.3732 0.00 1.00
Large dummy 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.3732 0.00 1.00
Luxury dummy 0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.3732 0.00 1.00
Notes: The observation of left column is at the vehicle model-year-month level, and the right is at
the segment-year-month level. Prices are in 2012 1000s RMB and include vehicle sales tax which is
10 percent in 2008, 2011 and 2012. The tax varied across vehicles with different engine size in 2009
and 2010. There are 21,228 observations in the dataset of model level from 2008 to 2012 with 1,769
models (vintage-nameplate), and 360 observations in the dataset of segment level from the same range
of years with 30 segments (vintage-segment).
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Table 2.2: Reduced From Analysis
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Ln(price) -5.091 -5.295 -5.530 -5.238 -7.815*
(3.799) (3.797) (3.823) (4.005) (4.719)
Beijing*2009 -0.0330 -0.0330
(0.0515) (0.0515)
Beijing*2010 0.0208 0.0208
(0.0675) (0.0675)
Beijing*2011 -0.937*** -3.478*** -3.543***
(0.0652) (0.253) (0.271)
Beijing*2012 -0.677*** -2.986*** -2.872***
(0.0966) (0.314) (0.324)
Beijing*2011*Ln(price) 0.478*** 0.502***
(0.0475) (0.0504)
Beijing*2012*Ln(price) 0.440*** 0.436***
(0.0574) (0.0590)
N 42456 42456 40170 23616 23616
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(market shares). All specifications include model fixed effects, city-segment
fixed effects and year-month fixed effects. Specification 1 and 2 use 42456 observations from 2008 to 2012.
Specification 3 uses the same observations as in Specification2 and 3 except dropping the observations in Nov.
and Dec. of 2010 and Jan. of 2011 for Beijing to remove the anticipation effect and has 40170 observations.
Specification 4 and 5 use 23616 observations from 2008 to 2010. Instruments for price are used in Specification
5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the model level.
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Table 2.3: Parameter Estimates from GMM
Variables
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Utility from vehicle (θvc)
Ln(Price) αP0 -13.59 0.02 -13.32 0.01 -13.20 0.10 -15.00 0.08 -13.60 0.40
Ln(Price)*Ln(Income) αP1 0.32 1.76× 10−3 0.59 8.17× 10−4 0.53 0.02 1.08 0.04 1.08 0.06
Ln(Income) 0.63 7.97× 10−4 0.44 3.29× 10−4 1.03 0.05 5.74 5.44× 10−4 1.60 0.03
σ for Ln(Price) 0.03 9.22× 10−4 0.51 3.22× 10−4 0.50 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.06
σ for constant 4.21 0.01 3.69 0.01 3.95 0.01 1.37 0.03 1.56 0.05
Utility from license-plate (θlc)
γ0 19.68 0.49 13.58 0.06 19.63 0.12 23.17 3.79 22.08 4.27
Persistent dynamic shock κit
h 2.70 0.01 3.71 2.56× 10−5 3.11 0.03 - - 2.59 0.08
P 0.05 1.13× 10−3 0.05 2.58× 10−4 0.04 2.98× 10−3 - - - -
Pinc1 - - - - - - - - 0.04 0.26
Pinc2 - - - - - - - - 0.12 0.02
Pinc3 - - - - - - - - 0.08 0.06
Pinc4 - - - - - - - - 0.08 0.83
Notes: Specification 1 is the benchmark and the preferred model. Specification 1 and 2 use 42456 observations from 2008 to 2012.
Specification 2 does not include the income moments for replacement buyers. Specification 3 drops the observations in Nov. and Dec.
of 2010 and Jan. of 2011 for Beijing to remove the anticipation effect and has 40170 observations. Specification 4 assumes away the
persistent shock to vehicle demand. Specification 5 allows transition probability of the persistent shock to vary across different income
levels. The four income groups are corresponding to the income groups reported in Appendix Table 2a where inc1 standards for the group
of the lowest income level and inc4 stands for the group of the highest income level.
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Table 2.4: Sales Impact of Lottery Policy in Beijing
Year Observed Sales
Counterfactual Sales
Benchmark Alternative 1 Alternative 2
2011 326,769 1,545,920 1,439,799 1,368,790
(741,231; 2,350,610) (779,994; 2,099,603) (718,415; 2,019,164)
2012 504,990 2,713,106 2,763,872 2,528,586
(1,271,008; 4,155,203) (1,354,035; 4,173,710) (1,114,375; 3,942,796)
Notes: Benchmark model corresponds to the baseline secification in Table 2.3. Alternative
1 corresponds to the model that drops the observations in Nov. and Dec. of 2010 and Jan.
of 2011 for Beijing to remove the anticipation effect. Alternative 2 corresponds to the model
that allows transition probability of the persistent shock of demand to vary across different
income levels. A 90% confidence interval is presented in the parenthesis.
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Table 5a: Counterfactual Simulations from 2008 to 2012
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Year Total Lottery Partcipants First-time Buyers
2008 50.58 0.59
2009 51.58 0.99
2010 49.77 0.64
2011 49.88 0.54
2012 49.07 2.74
Table 5b: Counterfactual Simulations in 2008
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Date First-time Lottery Participants First-time Buyers
2008Q1 29.80 0.75
2008Q2 3.12 5.85
2008Q3 0.35 0.58
2008Q4 0.07 0.47
Notes: The first column in Table 5a indicates the total households that enter the
lottery. The first column in Table 5b indicates total households that enter the
lottery for the first time. The second column in Table 5a and 5b indicate the total
households that buy a car for the first time. All numbers are in percentages and
monthly averages. Scenario 1 represents the counterfactual environment that the
lottery policy starts from the beginning of the sample period; scenario 2 represents
the counterfactual environment that the lottery policy is absent from 2008 to 2012.
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Table 2.6: Simulation Outcomes
2011 2012
Early Participations
79.02 40.03(in percentage to total participa-
tions)
Months Moved Forward to Partic-
ipate 10.62 5.40
(Average over all early partici-
pants)
Advanced Purchases
38.44 33.82(in percentage to total purchases)
Months Moved Forward to Pur-
chase 2.66 1.66
(Average over all early purchases)
Purchases Delayed
92.39 60.96(in percentage to total ownership
without the lottery policy)
Note: Early Partitipations refers to entrance of household into the
lottery before they would purchase a vehicle in absence of quantity
constarint. Early purchases refer to the purchases that household
made before the time they would start to own a vehicle in absence of
quantity constraint or the expiration rule.
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Table 2.7: Welfare Analysis
2011 2012
Total Consumer Welfare
First Best 16.46 24.41
Second Best 15.18 24.30
(Percentage to First Best) 92.26% 99.55%
Lottery 9.37 18.10
(Percentage to First Best) 56.96% 74.18%
Welfare Loss
Total Inefficiency 7.08 6.30
Static Misallocation 1.27 0.11
(Percentage to total loss) 17.99% 1.73%
Dynamic Misallocation 3.79 5.23
(Percentage to total loss) 53.46% 82.95%
Early Purchasing 2.02 0.97
(Percentage to total loss) 28.55% 15.32%
Total Dynamic Inefficiency 5.81 6.19
(Percentage to total loss) 82.01% 98.27%
Note: Consumer welfare units in Trillion RMB. First-best refers to
the scenario that licenses are allocated to households with highest val-
uation. Second-best refers to the scenario that licenses are allocated
with uniform probability among households who would purchase a ve-
hicle in absence of quantity constraint. Lottery refers to the scenario
under the lottery policy.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Inefficiency: A Theoretical
Analysis
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we formalize the concept of dynamic misallocation via a simple theoret-
ical model. We consider a market in which a policymaker allocates scarce resources
via lottery. Consumers have unit demand and with privately and persistently chang-
ing valuations for each of the object. In each period, they first see their private
valuation and then decide whether or not to enter the lottery. After all consumers
make their decision of participation, the policymaker allocates the resources among
all participants with uniform probability. Lottery winners receive the resource and
leave the market.
3.2 Model
We formalize the resource allocation problem in a two-period model with a unit
measure consumers in the market. Consumers are distinguished by their private
valuation of a durable resource - consumer l, for low type, with value ul for a unit
of this resource, and h, for high type, with value uh. The utility of outside option is
normalized to 0. To avoid the trivial results, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 4. uh > 0 > ul.
This assumption states that for low type consumers, the utility received from using
the resource is lower than the utility received from the outside option. That is, if were
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not constrained by the lottery policy, the low type consumers would not choose to
acquire the resource and choose the outside option instead. Consumer can privately
observe its own type at the beginning of each period, while it is common knowledge
that the measure of consumer h at the first period, t = 1, is r. All consumers transit
to type h with probability 1 at the last period, t = 2. And consumers rationally
foresee the evolution of their valuations and discount the future utilities at rate β.
A policymaker allocates q units of resources in each period via lottery. Consumers’
utility types are realized before they decide whether or not to participate the lottery.
Again we make the following assumption to avoid the trivial results:
Assumption 5. q < r < 1− q.
This assumption ensures the units of resource allocated in each period is always
less than the total number of high type consumers. Because the consumer space is
continuous, each individual consumer is small and has no strategic impact on the
aggregate outcome, i.e., the winning probability. It is also sensible to assume that
consumers with the same type should face the same information set and make the
same choices in each period. Hence we define a consumer’s strategy as a function of its
type and expected winning probability. Denote σxt as the probability that a consumer
of type x participates the lottery at period t. Denote pies(Ωt) as the expected winning
probability at period s based on information available at period t and pit as the realized
winning probability.The equilibrium we study in this model mirrors the requirement
for a Rational Expectation Equilibrium which is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Market Equilibrium). A market equilibrium is a tuple (σxt , pi
e
s(Ωt), pit),where
t, s ∈ {1, 2} and x ∈ {l, h} such that
(Optimality) For every t, σxt is the best response for consumer of type x given
pies(Ωt), and
(Rational expectation) For every s, t, pies(Ωt) = pis.
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3.3 Analysis and Results
We begin our analysis by looking at consumers’ incentive of participating at the last
period, t = 2. Because all consumers become the high type at that period, the
payoff of participating is pie2(Ω2)uh. The payoff of participating is always positive,
therefore all consumers will choose to participate at the last period. Now consider
the the strategy of consumers at the first period t = 1. Denote piet (Ω1) as the expected
winning probability at the period t based on information available at period t = 1.
A consumer of type x ∈ {h, l} enters the lottery at the first period receives expected
utility from winning the resource plus a continuous payoff from the optimal actions
at the next period. As mentioned above, all consumers become the high type and
choose to enter the lottery at the last period. Therefore, the total discounted payoff
at period t = 1, denoted as V xt , is:
V x1 = pi
e
1(Ω1)(1 + β)ux + (1− pie1(Ω1))βpie2(Ω1)uh. (3.1)
If the consumer does not enter the lottery, the payoff (denoted as W x1 ) is:
W x1 = βpi
e
2(Ω1)uh. (3.2)
As uh is positive, for high type consumers, it is optimal for them to participate
from the first period i.e. V h1 > W
x
1 as long as the expected winning probability for
the first period pie1 is strictly positive
1. In equilibrium, by the rational expectation
condition, the expected winning probability is consistent with the actual winning
probability, and the actual winning probability is at least equal to q, the winning
probability when all consumer participate the lottery. Therefore in the equilibrium
the high type will participate the lottery with probability 1, i.e., σh1 = 1.
Because ul is negative, the most efficient market outcome is that only the high
type enter the lottery at the first period and the low type do not enter until the second
1Notice that V h1 −Wh1 = pie1(1 + β(1− pie2))uh.
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period when their private valuations switch to high. However, the efficient outcome
may not be realized when the low type has incentive to participate early, i.e. when
their private valuation for the resource is negative. By participating the lottery early,
the low type may win the lottery early and suffer from receiving a negative utility
from the resource. However, the low type also increase the probability of receiving
the resource when their private valuation transit to high at the last period. The
lottery policy becomes inefficient when the low types participate the lottery in the
first period. This is because the high type consumers face a lower probability of
winning and policymaker may allocates the resource to the low type.
Definition 7 (Dynamic Misallocation). Dynamic misallocation exits in equilib-
rium that consumer L strategically enter the lottery in the first period.
The following theorem shows that there is an unique equilibrium such that low
type consumers join the lottery at the first period.
Proposition 1. With all assumptions stated above and uhis sufficiently large, there
exits equilibrium such that the low type consumers participate the lottery at the first
period, t = 1.
Proof. As mentioned above, all consumers will participate the lottery at t = 2 re-
gardless the belief on winning probability. Also because all the high type will choose
to participate the lottery from the first period, total participations in the first period
is greater than q, by assumption 5, which indicates that the winning probability for
the second period is q
1−q .
Now consider the payoff of the low type consumers. The payoff difference between
participation and non-participation is:
V l1 −W l1 = pie1(Ω1)(ul + β(1− pie2(Ω1))uh).
Because the low types will enter the lottery from the first period as long as
V l1 −W l1 ≥ 0
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by simplifying above equation and replace pie2(Ω1) by
q
1−q , we get∣∣∣∣uhul
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1β 1− q1− 2q . (3.3)
By assumptions, the right side of above equation is a well defined positive term if
uh is sufficiently large.
For the low type, the chance of winning the lottery is higher if they participate from
the first period, albeit losing from paying for extra participation costs and receiving
negative utility if they win the lottery. Hence when expecting to receive a high
enough payoff of using this resource in the last period, they will enter early in order
to increase the chance of winning. In terms of social welfare, dynamic misallocation
leads to welfare loss as resources may be allocated to consumers of the low type.
The lottery policy in this model generates welfare losses in two folds: First, some
high type consumers are delayed to receive the resources due to the quantity constraint
by the policy; Second, the low type enter the lottery from the first period and the
policymaker misallocates the resources to the low type consumers. The latter one is
the result of changing in participation timing of the low type consumers, therefore we
term the welfare of this channel as dynamic inefficiency. We formalize the definition
of dynamic inefficiency as follows.
Definition 8 (Dynamic Inefficiency). The dynamic inefficiency is the difference
between the welfare of efficient equilibrium that only the high type participate the
lottery at the first period, and the welfare of equilibrium with dynamic misallocation.
According to the above definition. The dynamic inefficiency for the second period
is zero as all consumers become the high type in that period. Thus we focus on the
discussion of the first period. Suppose that the condition defined in equation 3.3
is hold strictly, thus all consumers will participate in the first period indicating the
winning probability is q. Thus the ex-ante welfare received at first period is:
CSDynamic Misallocation = rq(uh + βuh) + (1− r)q(ul + βuh).
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In the efficient equilibrium, because only the high type participate at the first period,
the winning probability is q
r
and the ex-ante welfare received under this equilibrium
is:
CSEfficient Allocation = r
q
r
(uh + βuh).
Again, according to the definition of the dynamic inefficiency, the lottery policy gen-
erates a total welfare loss of q(1− r)(uh − ul) due to the dynamic misallocation.
3.4 Conclusion and Further Discussions
We use this simple model to formalize the dynamic misallocation of the lottery policy.
We cloud make more extensions to this model such as allowing infinite periods. But
we choose this simple model to highlight the dynamic misallocation.
The lottery policy in the model above does not cause static misallocation, as
all the high type have identical preferences. It is worth noting a possible extension
that accommodates both static and dynamic misallocation by allowing the valuations
of consumers randomly drawn from an interval above zero, i.e., u ∈ [ul, uh] and
ul < 0 < uh. Based on the similar argument as above, the high type consumers
(with u > 0, analogous to the high type consumers in the simple model above) will
participate the lottery for both periods. Even if the policymaker is able to allocate
to the high type consumers only, the lottery policy still creates inefficiency as the
mechanism may allocate the resource to the consumer with lower valuation (e.g. u is
close to 0) rather than to the consumer with the highest valuation (e.g. u is close to
u¯h). Because the high type consumers would choose to acquire the resource without
the lottery policy, the inefficiency stated above is irrelevant to the suboptimal timing,
we take the welfare loss of this channel as static inefficiency.
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Appendix A
Additional Graphs and Tables
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Figure A·1: Selected Vehicle Characteristics
Notes: Vehicle prices are computed based on the MSRP and sales tax. Average Sizes are computed by the product of vehicle
length and width. Fuel efficiency is measure by liters of fuel per mile (LPM).
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Table A.1: Cities with Vehicle Quota Restrictions
Year City Annual Quota (2014
in thousand)
Implementation Winning Probability
1990 Singapore Sustainable Levels
for road infrastruc-
ture development
Bi-monthly auction sys-
tem to highest bidders
-
1994 Shanghai 100 Monthly Auction to
highest bidders
-
2011 Beijing 130 Lottery 9.4 percent in January 2011;
less than 0.1 percent by the
end of2017.
2011 Guiyang 50 Free lottery to enter the
first ring zone
11.1 percent in the first lot-
tery;
0.13 percent in December
2017.
2012 Guangzhou 108 Hybrid mechanism:
60,000 plates by lottery;
48,000 plates by auc-
tion.
4.48 percent in May 2013;
0.76 percent in December
2017.
2014 Tianjin 90 Hybrid mechanism:
50,000 plates by lottery;
40,000 plates by auc-
tion.
3 percent in the first lottery
less than 0.1 percent by the
end of2017.
2014 Hangzhou 80 Hybrid mechanism:
16,000 plates by lottery;
64,000 plates by auc-
tion.
2.2 percent in the first lot-
tery;
0.85 percent in December
2017.
2015 Shenzhen 100 Hybrid mechanism:
50,000 plates by lottery;
50,000 plates by auc-
tion.
0.77 percent in the first lot-
tery;
0.33 percent in December
2017.
Notes: Data and policy information are collected from Singapore Ministry of Transport, Beijing
Municipal Commission of Transportation, Shanghai Municipal Commission of Transportation and
EMBARQ of World Resources Institute.
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Table 2a: The Share of Households by Income among Vehicle Buyers and All Households
City Annnual Household Income (in Yuan)
New Vehicle Buyers All Households
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Beijing ¡70K 12.64 12.81 15.28 9.78 6.54 65.47 51.62 44.87 38.32 33.41
Beijing 70K to 170K 43.68 66.56 59.26 58.70 52.34 31.60 45.19 50.88 55.83 58.05
Beijing 170K to 300K 26.44 12.50 16.67 26.09 28.97 2.61 2.70 3.67 4.81 7.07
Beijing ¿300K 17.24 8.13 8.80 5.43 12.15 0.33 0.49 0.57 1.04 1.48
Tianjin ¡70K 21.37 24.58 23.26 13.33 26.09 76.31 73.19 58.54 54.38 42.01
Tianjin 70K to 170K 56.41 57.54 55.04 63.81 63.04 22.64 25.44 39.72 42.97 54.72
Tianjin 170K to 300K 15.38 13.97 14.73 13.33 4.35 0.80 1.10 1.27 2.14 2.64
Tianjin ¿300K 6.84 3.91 6.98 9.52 6.52 0.24 0.27 0.47 0.51 0.63
Table 2b: The Share of Households by Income among First Time Buyers and Replacement Buyers
City Annnual Household Income (in Yuan)
First Time Buyers Replacement Buyers
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Beijing ¡70K 13.41 13.06 15.98 11.69 5.88 0.00 10.34 9.09 0.00 9.10
Beijing 70K to 170K 42.68 67.70 62.37 61.04 54.12 60.00 55.17 31.82 46.67 45.46
Beijing 170K to 300K 26.22 11.68 14.43 22.08 24.71 30.00 20.69 36.36 46.67 45.46
Beijing ¿300K 17.68 7.56 7.22 5.19 15.29 10.00 13.79 22.73 6.67 0.00
Tianjin ¡70K 21.70 22.56 21.05 13.48 31.58 18.18 46.67 40.00 12.50 0.00
Tianjin 70K to 170K 58.49 59.76 55.26 64.04 60.53 36.36 33.33 53.33 62.50 75.00
Tianjin 170K to 300K 14.15 14.63 16.67 14.61 5.26 27.27 6.67 0.00 6.25 0.00
Tianjin ¿300K 5.66 3.05 7.02 7.87 2.63 18.18 13.33 6.67 18.75 25.00
Notes: New Vehicle Buyers include both first time buyers and replacement buyers. The income data for vehicle buyers comes
from household survey data conducted by the National Information Center. The data on all households are from Annual
Statistical Yearbook for each city by Bureau of Statistics.
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Table A.3: City Characteristics in Beijing and Tianjin
Year City No. of Households
(mil.)
Average House-
hold Income (in
Yuan)
New Vehicle Sales National Vehi-
cle Sales(mil.)
% in nation
2008 Beijing 605.99 69,230 419,703 6.60 6.21
2009 Beijing 636.29 74,866 610,076 10.33 5.91
2010 Beijing 668.10 81,404 815,211 13.76 5.93
2011 Beijing 687.86 88,838 346,207 14.47 2.39
2012 Beijing 704.89 98,466 536,216 15.50 3.46
2008 Tianjin 347.88 56,131 160,221 6.76 2.37
2009 Tianjin 356.92 61,737 223,774 10.33 2.17
2010 Tianjin 366.20 69,477 276,716 13.76 2.01
2011 Tianjin 383.35 76,455 278,336 14.47 1.92
2012 Tianjin 399.92 84,138 292,442 15.50 1.89
Notes: The sales data are from R.L. Polk & CO. and other varables are from various issues of Annual Social and
Economic Development Report by each of the cities. The average income is nominal. New vehicle sales include
passenger cars and ligth truck.
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